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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
This study  exploits  the  introduction  of high  subsidies  for anti-malaria  products  in Senegal
in 2009  to investigate  whether  malaria  prevents  parents  from  investing  in  child  health.  A
simple  model  of health  investments  under  competing  mortality  risks  predicts  that  private
expenses  to fight  malaria  and  other  diseases  should  increase  in response  to  anti-malaria
public  interventions.  We  test  and  validate  this  prediction  using  original  panel  data  from  a
household  expenditure  survey  combined  with  geographical  information  on malaria  preva-
lence. We  find  that  health  expenditures  in  malarious  regions  catch  up with  non-malarious
regions.  The  same  result  holds  for  parental  health-seeking  behavior  against  other  diseases
like diarrhea.  These  patterns  cannot  be  explained  by differential  trends  between  regions.
Our results  suggest  that  behavioral  responses  to anti-malaria  campaigns  magnify  their
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.0/).1. Introduction
Malaria has long been the leading cause of child death in
Sub-Saharan Africa, and is expensive to treat and difficult
to prevent. In this context, does malaria depress parental
investment in child health? To answer this question, we
exploit recent interventions that have made anti-malaria
products suddenly affordable to most households.
At the beginning of the 21st century, there was  a series
of initiatives coordinated by the international commu-
nity under the Roll Back Malaria partnership to galvanize
the fight against malaria in Africa. Very large-scale inter-
ventions were implemented to distribute anti-malaria
products for free or at highly subsidized prices. On
the preventive side, 900 million insecticide-treated nets
(henceforth ITNs) have been distributed since the early
2000s. Nowadays, an estimated two-thirds of children
article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
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sleep under an ITN compared to virtually none before the
distribution started.2 On the curative side, free access to
treatments called artemisinin-based combination thera-
pies (henceforth ACT) has been promoted. The scope of this
intervention is more modest with an estimated 16% of chil-
dren treated in 2015, but the coverage is increasing rapidly.
Over the past 15 years, malaria prevalence and mortality
have been halved (World Health Organization, 2015).
In this paper, we examine how health-seeking behavior
has changed in response to these interventions. We  argue
that, before Roll Back Malaria, poor households had few
incentives to invest in child health because fighting a major
cause of death was unaffordable. Substantially decreasing
the price of preventive and curative anti-malaria treat-
ments made it profitable to invest in health, not only to
avoid malaria but also other causes of death. Dow et al.
(1999) were the first to claim that subsidizing treatments
against one disease might boost households’ expenses to
prevent other diseases, because people allocate efforts to
equalize lifetimes from all causes of death. We  adapt their
framework to show that complementarities also arise in a
stochastic setting at the extensive margin. Our model pre-
dicts that households should start spending on child health
in response to anti-malaria public interventions.
To test this prediction, we exploit original panel data
from a Senegalese household survey providing detailed
information on health expenses. Malaria control efforts in
Senegal took off between the two waves of the panel (2006
and 2011), providing a perfect setting to analyze house-
holds’ responses. Our empirical strategy is to compare the
evolution of child health expenditures between malarious
and non-malarious regions of Senegal. We  find that child
health expenditures were initially lower and increased
more, principally at the extensive margin, in malarious
regions. The catch-up was  not only in levels but also in com-
position, with parents spending more on preventative care.
Triple differences exploiting intra-household comparisons
and variation in intensity of campaigns across health dis-
tricts support the idea that anti-malaria campaigns caused
the change in spending behavior: the catch-up (i) does
not happen for health spending on adults, who are less
at risk; and (ii) is stronger in districts where more bed-
nets were distributed. Finally, we exploit Demographic and
Health Surveys conducted roughly at the same time (2005
and 2010) to show that health-seeking behavior against
other diseases, like diarrhea, increased more in malarious
regions.
Our results could potentially be driven by differential
pre-trends or changes in other determinants of expendi-
tures. We  provide evidence that this is not the case. When
we account for total income, distance to health facilities,
other large-scale public health campaigns, rainfall patterns
and region-specific linear trends, our estimates are even
larger and more significant. Last, our results are qualita-
tively unchanged once we account for selective migration,
attrition, changes in family structure, and use alternative
2 Another preventive intervention is to have public agents spray the
inside of dwellings with an insecticide (indoor residual spraying, hence-
forth IRS), but it covers less than 5% of the population at risk in Africa. Economics 73 (2020) 102330
definitions of high prevalence. We  finally discuss the rel-
ative roles of the subsidy component and the information
component of anti-malaria interventions.
Broadly speaking, our paper fits in the literature on
private investments in human capital in developing coun-
tries. We  examine how health investments respond to
changes in a specific mortality risk, while most exist-
ing studies look at educational investments. For instance,
Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009) show that reduc-
tions in maternal mortality risk lead to an increase in
girls’ educational attainment in Sri Lanka. Similar results
have been established by the HIV literature. Areas with the
largest increase in HIV prevalence experience the largest
decline in schooling in Sub-Saharan Africa (Fortson, 2011).
This is later mitigated by access to therapies, which reduces
perceived mortality risks and prompts parents to spend
more on child education (Baranov and Kohler, 2018; Lucas
et al., 2019). As for health outcomes, Oster (2012) finds
that reductions in risky sexual behavior in response to
the HIV epidemic in Africa are larger in areas with lower
non-HIV mortality. A related strand of the literature is pri-
marily interested in whether parents reinforce or attenuate
differences in endowments across children. These stud-
ies use public interventions as an exogenous change in
endowments and typically find that parental investments
are higher for children who benefit from the intervention
(Almond and Mazumder, 2013). Of particular interest for
us are the articles by Adhvaryu and Nyshadham (2014)
and Ravindran (2018). The first one shows that children
are breastfed longer and vaccinated more often if they pre-
viously received iodine in Tanzania; and the second one
argues that parental investments reinforce the impact of an
early-childhood development program in India. Our focus
is different: we aim to explain why  complementarities
arise, rather than exploring the consequences for intra-
household allocations.
Specifically, we are the first to use data on private health
expenditures to validate a model with complementarities
between disease-specific investments. In their paper, Dow
et al. (1999) provide empirical support by showing that
birth outcomes improve after child vaccination campaigns
in Sub-Saharan Africa. The evidence is only suggestive,
because we  do not know what additional interventions
were embedded in the campaigns, and they might have
directly influenced maternal health. We argue that data
on health outcomes is not enough and that data on health
expenses is necessary to implement a proper, direct test of
the model. Providing empirical support for such a model
is useful to explain why poor people in insalubrious envi-
ronments invest little in their children’s health. Treatments
to avoid a given disease might be affordable, but once we
recognize that there are many diseases, the total cost of
fighting against all of them may  be prohibitive.
Another contribution is to provide evidence of behav-
ioral responses to health subsidies in Africa. Whether these
responses undermine or magnify the intended impact of
programs is a long-lasting discussion. A large literature in
economics studies whether public interventions crowd out
private investments. In the case of health in poor coun-
tries, the debate is not over. On the one hand, Bennett























































subsidy related to a specific disease raises private incen-
tives to fight all causes of deaths. Chang (2005) further
introduces uncertainty about lifetimes in the model andP. Rossi and P. Villar / Journal o
ight generate moral hazard issues. He documents the case
f the Philippines, where the introduction of piped water
orsened household sanitary behavior. On the other hand,
upas (2014) argues that subsidies might foster long-run
doption through positive learning effects. Using experi-
ental data from Kenya, she shows that subsidizing ITNs
as a positive impact on households’ willingness to pay
n the future. She finds no evidence of negative behav-
oral responses such as anchoring effects or cross-product
ntitlement effects. Armand et al. (2017) do not find empir-
cal support for crowding-out effects, either. They examine
he relationship between a private (ITN) and a public (IRS)
nvestment to fight malaria in Eritrea. In line with our
esults, they find that households were more likely to buy
 bednet when public health agents had sprayed their
wn dwellings with insecticide. In our context, we argue
hat behavioral responses magnify the impact of Roll Back
alaria because there is a complementarity between pub-
ic and private health expenditures.
Our paper has strong implications for health poli-
ies in Africa. It is often argued that horizontal (health
ystem-wide) interventions should be preferred over verti-
al (disease-specific) interventions, because targeting one
isease may  lead to negative spillover effects in the health
ystem by drawing resources away from other conditions.
ur results suggest that, in the case of anti-malaria cam-
aigns, spillovers can also be positive: people reallocate
heir resources to fight other diseases. This mechanism
elps explain “one of the surprising results to emerge
rom large-scale trials of insecticide treated bednets –
hat the reduction in all-cause mortality with the use
f bednets is considerably greater than the reduction in
alaria-attributed mortality” (Sachs and Malaney, 2002,
. 684).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
xisting evidence on malaria control and child health. Sec-
ion 3 presents a simple model of health investments.
ection 4 describes the data and Section 5 explains our
mpirical strategy. Section 6 provides the main empirical
esults. Sections 7 and 8 deal with alternative explanations
nd robustness checks. Section 9 discusses the price and
nformation channels and concludes.
. Malaria control and child health in Sub-Saharan
frica
Since 2000, the evolution of malaria in Africa has been
losely monitored by medical studies.3 The general consen-
us is that Roll Back Malaria substantially contributed to
educing malaria prevalence and mortality across the con-
inent (Bhatt et al., 2015). In Senegal, three articles provide
vidence of a causal relationship between malaria control
nterventions and progress in child health using differ-
nt, complementary methods: a cross-sectional matching
odel (Lim et al., 2011), a longitudinal study of a surveil-
ance site (Trape et al., 2014) and a plausibility framework
esigned by the American Journal of Tropical Medicine
3 See reviews by World Health Organization (2015), Kesteman et al.
2017) and Appendix A for more details. Economics 73 (2020) 102330 3
and Hygiene (Thwing et al., 2017). In particular, the last
study documents that (i) child mortality decreased by 40%
between 2005 and 2010, with greater declines among age
groups and regions initially most at risk for malaria; and
(ii) only 3% of consultations and 4% of deaths were due
to malaria after the interventions, against 34% and 18%,
respectively, in 2006.
An open question in the literature evaluating the effec-
tiveness of recent malaria control interventions is whether
effects are heterogeneous (Kesteman et al., 2017; Yazoume
et al., 2017). We  shed light on this question in Table 1. Using
Demographic and Health Surveys conducted in 19 African
countries, we estimate the trends in child mortality before
and after the start of Roll Back Malaria, for regions with low
and high initial malaria prevalence, distinguishing between
rich and poor households. Before the intervention, over the
period 1995–2001, child mortality was  decreasing for both
rich and poor households in regions with low initial preva-
lence. Whereas in regions with high initial prevalence, only
the rich households display a decreasing trend; there was
no progress for poor households. After the intervention,
mortality also started to decline also for poor households
in highly malarious regions; they are the only ones who
exhibit a significant break in trends.
The different pre-trends cannot be explained by dif-
ferent health interventions between regions because rich
households in malarious regions were able to progress as
much as rich households in non-malarious regions. They
cannot be explained either by a poverty trap, because
in non-malarious regions poor households were able to
progress as much as rich households. There seems to
be some obstacles specific to being poor and living in
malarious environments. The explanation we  put forward
in this paper is that malaria makes health investments
unprofitable for poor households and prevents them from
benefiting from improvements in other causes of death. For
richer households, anti-malaria products were affordable
prior to 2002, making health expenses on other diseases
worthwhile.4
3. Conceptual framework
The main insight from the theoretical literature on
health investments decisions is that competing mortality
risks generate complementarities between disease-specific
investments. In a seminal paper, Dow et al. (1999) argue
that the production function of overall lifetime under com-
peting risks is Leontief. In a deterministic setting, this
implies that the optimal allocation of investments equal-
izes the times of death across all causes. Therefore, a publicspecifies the conditions under which a disease-specific
4 An alternative explanation would be that malaria depresses adult
health that is, either maternal health or the breadwinner’s health. This
would limit poor households’ ability to care and pay for their children’s
health. However, the adult health channel fails to account for the patterns
in  total expenditures that we document in Section 7.
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Table  1
Stylized fact: trends in child mortality.
High prevalence High prevalence Low prevalence Low prevalence
Poor  Rich Poor Rich
Linear trend before Roll Back Malaria −0.0014 −0.0038*** −0.0054*** −0.0044***
(0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0010)
Linear  trend after Roll Back Malaria −0.0053*** −0.0042*** −0.0057*** −0.0043***
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Observations 134,806 196,943 296,879 317,598
p  Value Before = After 0.033 0.765 0.698 0.950
DHS in: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, DRC, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
The table presents estimates of the linear trend in child mortality before (1995–2001) and after the start (2002–2011) of anti-malaria campaigns for
different populations: the richest half and poorest half of households (according to durable goods ownership) in regions with high and low initial malaria
prevalence (≥ 50% or < 50% of children aged 2 to 10 are infected by the parasite).
 the est
s beforeWe  kept only children born at most 10 years before the survey to perform
The last line reports the p-value of a test of equality between linear trend
S.e.  in (). *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01.
reduction in price is predicted to increase other invest-
ments.
These models only discuss interior solutions, whereas
corner solutions play a crucial role in our context. Indeed,
the majority of parents do not spend anything on child
health. In our Senegalese baseline data, less than 40% report
having some child health expenditures during the previ-
ous year, and seeking some medical care when a child
is sick. Child health expenditures account for 3% of total
expenditures.5 In Appendix A.2, we propose a simple model
explaining how competing mortality risks influence the
extensive margin i.e., the decision to invest or not in child
health. The main idea is that the expected benefit of pre-
venting one cause of death depends on the overall survival
function, which is itself a product of cause-specific survival
functions. This generates complementarities because some
health investments are only worth it when the mortality
risk from competing causes has been sufficiently reduced.
If the risk of dying from one disease is high, and little can
be done because treatments are unaffordable, this makes
other investments unprofitable.
Our model predicts that private health expenses should
increase in response to Roll Back Malaria. Before the
intervention, malaria was a major cause of death. The dis-
ease accounted for 17% of deaths among children aged
under five in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2000 (World Health
Organization, 2015). If we exclude neonatal deaths, result-
ing primarily from prematurity, birth asphyxia and birth
trauma, roughly one death in four was caused by malaria.6
Anti-malaria products were very expensive, represent-
ing between 20% and 40% of total out-of-pocket health
expenditures (Mugisha et al., 2002; Onwujekwe et al.,
2000). In a competing risk framework, this implies that
those households that could not afford to fight malaria
also gave up on some other health investments. Roll Back
5 To give some perspective, out-of-pocket health expenditures – includ-
ing adult health – represent about 8–10% of total household expenditures
in  rural Kenya and urban India (Dupas, 2011).
6 Other major causes were upper and lower respiratory infections
(influenza, diphtheria, pneumonia, bronchiolitis, ear infections), diarrheal
diseases, and measles, accounting together for one half of post-neonatal
deaths.imation.
 and after 2002.
Malaria radically changed the situation by reducing the cost
of preventing and curing the disease. Once anti-malaria
treatments became affordable, other health investments
became worth it. So the dramatic decrease in the price
of anti-malaria products is predicted to increase not only
investments against malaria but also investments against
other diseases.7 Besides the change in prices, Roll Back
Malaria may  also have changed beliefs about the mortality
risk of malaria. The disease is clearly perceived by parents
as the main threat to their children – e.g., Ndiaye et al.
(1994) in Senegal, Tarimo et al. (2000) in Tanzania and
Deressa and Ali (2009) in Ethiopia. Information campaigns
are likely to make the risk of dying from malaria even more
salient and to increase confidence in treatments (Armand
et al., 2017). In our framework, this would accentuate the
cross-disease effect. In the last section of this article we  dis-
cuss the relative contribution of prices and information in
explaining the changes we observe.
Empirically, as described in the next section, we observe
total expenditures on child health and health-seeking
behavior against other diseases. To formalize, denote q
treatments (curative and preventative) bought by house-
holds at price p, and Q treatments provided for free; malaria
is subscripted by m and other diseases by o. We  have
data on (pm.qm + po.qo) and Pr((qo + Qo) > 0), whereas
our theoretical predictions are for qm and qo. Changes in
total expenditures capture both changes in quantities and
changes in prices. Changes in health-seeking behavior are
driven by changes in both costly and free treatments. To
single out the variation in private investments, we combine
three predictions:
P1 Total expenditures on child health should increase.
P2 The proportion of households with no child healthexpenditures should decrease.
P3 Health-seeking behavior against other diseases should
increase.
7 Note that a standard model of investment in human capital, without
complementarities, would fail to explain why some parents start spending
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After Roll Back Malaria, pm is close to zero so child health
xpenditures mainly consist of po.qo. A rise in po would
e consistent with prediction 1, but not with predictions
 and 3. Free distribution of treatments against other dis-
ases would be consistent with prediction 3, but not with
redictions 1 and 2. Taken together, the three predictions
mply an increase in qo.
. Data
We  test these predictions in the Senegalese context,
here malaria control endeavors started in 2009. We  com-
ine three datasets providing information before and after
009.
.1. Panel data on household expenditures on child
ealth
Our main dataset is the Poverty and Family Structure8
Pauvreté et Structure Familiale, PSF by its French acronym)
anel of individuals. The PSF dataset is a unique panel of
ndividuals, with the first wave in 2006–2007 and the sec-
nd one in 2011 (DeVreyer et al., 2008). The first wave
PSF1) is representative of the national population and was
onducted on 1800 households. All individuals from this
ample were tracked down during the second wave (PSF2)
nd interviewed along with all the members of the house-
old they were found to belong to at that point. The number
f household splits is sizeable and the second wave covers
bout 3200 households.
One original feature of this dataset is that households
ere divided into sub-units according to their budgetary
rrangements. The survey provides information on non-
ealth expenditures made during the last 12 months at the
ub-unit level. This is particularly relevant when the house-
old head lives with his brother(s) or has multiple wives. In
hat case, each mother and her dependent children9 form
ne sub-unit, since the mother is usually the main caregiver
nd responsible for her children needs and well-being. In
he rest of the paper, we use to the term “household” to
efer to the sub-unit. Importantly for our purpose, the sur-
ey registers information on private health expenditures
aid during the last 12 months before the interview.10
oughly two-thirds of health expenditures are devoted to
edication purchase, followed by consultation, hospital-
zation, and commuting to health facilities. These expenses
re recorded at the individual level so we have two  poten-
ial units of observation: either the child or the sibship (all
ependent children of the same mother). In the child-level
nalysis, we have more observations and we follow the
8 Momar  Sylla and Matar Gueye of the Agence Nationale de la Statis-
ique et de la Démographie of Senegal (ANSD), and Philippe De Vreyer
University of Paris-Dauphine and IRD-DIAL), Sylvie Lambert (Paris School
f  Economics-INRA) and Abla Safir (now with the World Bank) designed
he  survey. The data collection was conducted by the ANSD.
9 A dependent child is a child under 18 or an unmarried child living
ith the mother. In both waves, about 17% of children do not live in the
ame household as their mother.
10 Only 1% of these expenditures are reimbursed by health insurance
chemes. Economics 73 (2020) 102330 5
exact same individuals so it might seem the relevant unit.
However, this approach has several drawbacks. Children in
PSF2 are by construction five to six years older than in PSF1.
As a consequence, when comparing both waves, we  cannot
disentangle changes in health-seeking behavior and life-
cycle effects. What we  want to measure is parental health
investment in children, especially in young children who
are the most vulnerable. Moreover, some health expendi-
tures might be hard to assign to a given child if they benefit
many of them. That is why our preferred unit of analysis
is the sibship; we  discuss regressions at the child level in
robustness tests presented in Section 8.
The first column of Table 2 shows some descriptive
characteristics. Our sample of interest is made up by 1594
households that we observe in both waves. In addition, 789
households are only observed in the second wave: these
mothers did not have any dependent children in the first
wave. In addition, 573 households are only observed in the
first wave: 368 mothers no longer had a dependent child
in the second wave, and 205 mothers could not be found.
Implications of this attrition are discussed in Section 8. The
main advantage of PSF is to provide a panel so we can
estimate regressions with mother fixed effects. The main
disadvantage of this dataset is that only expenses are reg-
istered, and not health-seeking behavior broken down by
disease.11
4.2. Repeated cross-sections on child health status
To get information by disease, we exploit the Demo-
graphic and Health Surveys (DHS hereafter) conducted in
Senegal in 2005 and 2010–2011. They measure trends in
child morbidity and health-seeking behavior. DHS report
cases of children aged five and under suffering from diar-
rhea, fever, and coughing. Parents were asked if they sought
treatment when the child was sick. DHS also collects data
on vaccination but we  do not consider vaccines as an
outcome of interest for two reasons. First, they reflect
changes in public rather than private health investment.
As part of the Expanded Program on Immunization, chil-
dren are vaccinated for free in public health care facilities
or during outreach activities like mobile vaccination teams
or annual national vaccination campaigns. Second, cover-
age was already high in 2005: depending on the vaccine,
between three quarters and 90% of children had been vac-
cinated (Ndiaye and Ayad, 2006). The main drawback is
that the survey is a repeated cross-section, so changes over
time may  capture both changes in behavior and changes in
population.
4.3. Geographical data on malaria prevalenceOur identification strategy exploits the spatial variation
in the initial exposure to malaria. We  use the Malaria Atlas,
a map  constructed by epidemiologists, to get a measure
of the prevalence before anti-malaria interventions (Bhatt
11 PSF contains questions about the health status of children and health-
seeking behavior, but unfortunately they are not comparable between the
two waves of the panel.
6 P. Rossi and P. Villar / Journal of Health Economics 73 (2020) 102330
Table  2
Summary statistics.
Full sample High prevalence Low prevalence pval (diff)
(1)  (2) (3) (4)
Baseline characteristics in 2006/2007 (PSF1)
Malaria prevalence in 2000 0.20 0.37 0.09 0.00
Household in Dakar region 0.30 0.00 0.48 0.00
Household in other urban area 0.20 0.17 0.22 0.00
Household in rural area 0.50 0.83 0.30 0.00
Household total consumption (thousands of CFA francs) 310.06 185.40 384.33 0.00
Mother’s age 34.99 34.50 35.28 0.11
Panel  characteristics
Number of children in PSF1 2.60 2.70 2.55 0.02
Number of children in PSF2 2.67 2.74 2.62 0.07
Average age of children in PSF1 7.45 7.42 7.47 0.80
Average age of children in PSF2 7.55 7.22 7.75 0.01
Mother in same malaria prevalence cluster btw 2 waves* 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94
#  of clusters 150 48 102
#  of households in PSF1 2167 809 1358
#  of households in PSF2 2383 908 1475
#  of households in both waves 1594 616 978
Data: PSF Panel. PSF1 is the first wave in 2006–2007; PSF2 is the second wave in 2011.
 as a nu
w preva
*Computed only for mothers found in both waves. We define a household
The  last column shows the p-value of the difference between high and lo
1  euro ≈656 CFA francs.
et al., 2015). We  chose 2000 as our year of reference because
of measurement issues in later years.12 Both PSF and DHS
contain GPS information about the village or city block (that
we call “cluster”) where the respondent lives, making it
possible to merge them with the Malaria Atlas.
5. Empirical strategy
Our model predicts how private investments in child
health should respond to anti-malaria campaigns in regions
where malaria is endemic. The first source of variation that
we exploit is temporal, comparing household expenditures
on child health before and after the campaign. However,
expenditures may  change over time for many reasons
unrelated to the intervention of interest. To account for
the time-varying determinants of expenditures, we exploit
another source of variation, comparing malarious and non-
malarious regions of Senegal. Under the assumption that
trends in these determinants are the same in all regions,
our difference-in-differences strategy identifies responses
to anti-malaria campaigns.
In 2008, the Programme National de Lutte contre
le Paludisme (PNLP; National Malaria Control Program)
initiated a four-year-plan of massive anti-malaria interven-
tions. The PNLP actions were coordinated to achieve the
goals of the Roll Back Malaria partnership and involved
nearly all national and international partners engaged
12 For the year 2000, estimates of prevalence are based on a map of cli-
matic suitability for malaria transmission. For later years, estimates are
derived from an epidemiological model combining information on initial
conditions as well as coverage and impact of anti-malaria interventions.
This model relies on strong assumptions in terms of external validity, lin-
earity and exogeneity, that we  are not willing to make. Therefore, we
prefer to use the estimates based on initial climatic conditions only. As
a  robustness test, we  consider estimates of prevalence in 2006 and find
comparable results (cf. Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix).clear family composed of a mother and her dependent children.
lence areas.
with malaria prevention and control in the country. As
shown by Fig. 1, the funds allocated to fight the dis-
ease jumped in 2009, once USAID joined the team of
donors. The US aid agency coordinates the President’s
Malaria Initiative, which started in Angola, Tanzania, and
Uganda, and was  gradually extended to other African coun-
tries. Senegal was  part of the second wave, along with
Malawi, Mozambique, and Rwanda. We therefore argue
that large-scale interventions were the result of an exoge-
nous push by foreign aid donors. Beforehand, in the period
2002–2008, only very targeted and small distributions of
bednets and other malaria-related goods and services took
place (President’s Malaria Initiative, 2008). The first nation-
wide ITNs distribution campaign took place in June 2009
and targeted specifically children under five and preg-
nant women. More than 6 million ITNs were distributed
between 2008 and 2010 throughout the country, and no
specific area was singled out (Plan National, 2015). For
pregnant women  and mothers of under-five children, ITNs
could be obtained either for free or at a very subsidized
price: maximum of 1 euro, instead of the 10–12 euros mar-
ket price (President’s Malaria Initiative, 2008). The main
coverage scheme involved a door-to-door approach to
deliver a voucher for an ITN to be redeemed later at a
distribution point. The campaign also communicated the
importance of using ITNs. As a result, the ITN coverage mea-
sured in the DHS-MICS doubled from 20% in 2006 to 40%
in 2010. Moreover, in 2010 curative treatments (ACT) were
made free for all ages in public health facilities. To sum up,
in 2009–2010, the price of preventive and curative treat-
ments against malaria decreased substantially to become
virtually zero.
Before anti-malaria campaigns started, there was  con-
siderable variation in malaria prevalence across regions of
Senegal. The map  in Fig. 2 represents the proportion of chil-
dren infected by the parasite in 2000. The proportion ranges
from below 2% in the arid region of Louga to above 60% in
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Fig. 1. Temporal variation: Funds allocated to anti-malaria interventions.
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ource:  World Health Organization (2015). The figure shows the amoun
009,  which coincides with the first nationwide distribution of bednets an
n  private health investments before (in 2005–2006) and after (in 2010–
he areas bordering Guinea. The national average is 24%.
e  use this threshold to define areas with a low malaria
revalence (below average, in dark blue on the map) and
reas with a high prevalence (above average, in light blue
nd yellow on the map). In low prevalence areas, the aver-
ge prevalence rate is below 10%, which is considered by
pidemiologists as hypoendemic (Bhatt et al., 2015). At the
ottom of Fig. 2, a map  shows the location of the 150 clus-
ers surveyed in PSF, either in high prevalence areas (black
riangles) or in low prevalence areas (gray circles). We  use
he High-Low categories in the descriptive statistics, for
larity of exposition, whereas in the econometric specifi-
ation, we exploit the continuous variation in prevalence.
We  proceed to a difference-in-differences analysis with
ndividual fixed effects:
i,t = ˛0 + ˛1 Prevalencei + ˛2 Postt
+ ˛3 Postt × Prevalencei + ui + εi,t (1)
i,t is the outcome of interest: the annual level of child
ealth expenditures per capita in the household (predic-
ion 1), a dummy  variable equal to one if the household
as no health expenditure (prediction 2), a dummy  indicat-
ng whether a child was sick and left untreated (prediction
). Prevalencei indicates the initial level of prevalence in
he city block or village (the “cluster”) where household i
ives. Postt equals one if the survey took place after 2009.
tandard errors are clustered at the cluster level because
alaria prevalence is measured at that level and we have
nough clusters. We  test predictions 1 and 2 using panel
ata, in which case we  include a mother fixed effect ui
note that ˛1 cannot be estimated). We  test prediction 3
sing repeated cross-sections, in which case we are not
ble to include a mother fixed effect. In Sections 7 and 8,
e introduce time-varying controls to account for potential
onfounders.
The ideal experiment would be to randomly allocate
ree anti-malaria treatments in endemic areas and to exam-
ne the impact on households’ health-seeking behavior.13
13 This experiment is run in Dupas (2014) with another objective: check
hether subsidizing ITN decreases the willingness to pay for another
ealth product, water chlorine. She finds no significant impact and there-
ore rules out cross-product entitlement effects. But the sample size iss allocated to anti-malaria interventions in Senegal. There is a jump in
e delivery of curative treatments in public health facilities. We have data
e jump.
In our setting, anti-malaria campaigns were implemented
in the whole country at the same time. There is no area
excluded or targeted at a later stage that can be used as a
control group. Instead, we use areas where the campaign
could not make a difference because malaria was already
under control. Our counterfactual is not what would have
happened in malarious regions in the absence of the inter-
vention, but what would have happened if there was
no malaria in these regions. Such a strategy is used by
Bleakley (2010), Cutler et al. (2010), and Lucas (2010) to
assess the impact of childhood exposure to malaria on
socio-economic outcomes. They exploit malaria eradica-
tion campaigns in several American and Asian countries.
In the same vein, we exploit Roll Back Malaria to test
the hypothesis that, when anti-malaria treatments are not
heavily subsidized, the disease prevents poor households
from investing in child health.
This strategy was  recently formalized and named
“difference-in-differences in reverse” in an econometric
article by Kim and Lee (2019). In a standard difference-
in-differences (DD), the treatment and control groups are
similar in the pre-period and different in the post-period.
In a difference-in-differences in reverse (DDR), they are
different at the start, and become similar. This changes
the interpretation of the coefficient on the interaction
term. DD identifies post-period effects, while DDR iden-
tifies pre-period effects. In our context, we can define the
treatment as “being affected by malaria.” In the pre-period,
malaria prevalence is higher in some areas: they form our
treatment group. In the post-period, malaria prevalence is
low everywhere, as documented in Section 2. The interac-
tion term therefore captures the impact of malaria in the
pre-period, provided other drivers of health expenditures
evolved in the same way  for all households.
Is this assumption likely to hold? Columns 2 and 3 of
Table 2 provide some descriptive statistics of our sam-
ple, by initial malaria prevalence. Household structure is
roughly the same everywhere: there are 2.6 children on
average, the mother is around 35 years old and the average
age of children is seven. But rural and poorer areas tend
small and the coefficient is positive and large, suggesting that subsidizing
ITN might have fostered the adoption of water chlorine.
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Fig. 2. Spatial variation: Initial malaria prevalence.
Notes: The Malaria Atlas map shows the proportion of children between age 2 and 10 infected by Plasmodium falciparum in 2000. It ranges from below
 a low 
ttom sh
egend, t2%  to above 60%. We use the national average, 24%, to define areas with
prevalence (above average, in light blue and yellow). The map on the bo
circles) areas. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure l
to be more affected by the disease. We  argue that, despite
these differences, comparing areas with high and low initial
prevalence can be informative for four reasons. First, we use
previous DHS waves to look at pre-trends in health-seeking
behavior and show that the catch-up had not started
beforehand. Second, we exploit the panel structure of PSF
to account for composition effects in health expenditures.malaria prevalence (below average, in dark blue) and areas with a high
ows the location of PSF clusters in high (black triangles) and low (gray
he reader is referred to the web  version of this article.).
Indeed, mother fixed effects allow us to disentangle the
effect of public subsidies from that of changes in population
characteristics. What remains to be discussed are changes
in the environment that could have affected low and high
prevalence areas differently during our period of interest.
This is our third test: we examine differential trends in
other determinants of child health expenses: total income,
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Fig. 3. Child health expenditures, before and after anti-malaria interventions, by initial prevalence of malaria.
Notes:  Data: PSF Panel. The figure shows the evolution of (a) annual health expenditures per child, in thousands of CFA francs (1 euro = 656 CFA francs) and
( nd high


















longer significant at conventional levels, but the magnitude
remains large. Given the distribution of initial prevalence,
it corresponds to a catch-up of 3835 (resp. 1726) CFAb)  the fraction of households with zero spending on child health, in low a
nti-malaria interventions. Graph (a): the difference-in-differences is equ
s  equal to −13 p.p. (p-value = 0.012).
ealth infrastructure, other health campaigns, rainfall pat-
erns, and geographical dynamics. We  show in Section 7
hat they are unlikely to explain our results. Fourth, we use
wo triple differences to circumvent the concern that unob-
erved time-varying heterogeneity between high and low
revalence areas is driving the catch-up.
. Results
.1. Health expenditures
Fig. 3a shows descriptive statistics on health expendi-
ures in the two waves of PSF, comparing areas with a high
nd low prevalence of malaria. In the first wave, households
n high prevalence areas spent much less: on average, 1720
FA francs per child per year against 7335 in low prevalence
reas. Between the two waves, they tripled their consump-
ion of health commodities, up to 5215, while there was
o significant change in low prevalence areas. Fig. 3b dis-
lays the extensive margin. Households in high prevalence malaria prevalence areas, before (2006 in black) and after (2011 in gray)
39 CFA francs (p-value = 0.051). Graph (b): the difference-in-differences
areas were 15.7 p.p more likely to not pay expenses toward
health in 2006 than the others. In 2011, they had almost
caught up. Between the two  PSF waves, the proportion of
households with zero expenditure decreased by 17.7 p.p
whereas a more moderate downturn of 4.7 p.p happened
in low prevalence areas.14
In Table 3, we include mother fixed effects and exploit
the continuous variation in prevalence. Regarding the aver-
age level of expenditures, in column 1, results are less
strong, suggesting that part of the catch-up is driven by
composition effects. But there is also evidence of a change
in behavior: the coefficient on the interaction term is no14 Estimation of the difference-in-differences regression without fixed
effects can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix. The coefficients on the
interaction terms are significantly different from zero.
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Table  3
Difference-in-differences: child health expenditures.
Specification Level Without top 1% Log Ihs Zero spending
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post × Prevalence 6.392 3.375* 3.092** 0.929** −0.345**
(5.800) (1.885) (1.348) (0.369) (0.168)
Post  0.546 −0.139 0.098 0.014 −0.015
(1.776) (0.589) (0.342) (0.105) (0.040)
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N  4550 4504 4550 4550 4550
Mean  of dep. var. in 2006 5.24 3.22 −3.67 0.88 0.61
Data: PSF Panel.
Difference-in-differences regression with mother fixed effects. Linear probability models. The level of observation is a household, composed of a mother
and  her dependent children.
Dependent variables: health expenditures per capita for children in the household (thousands of CFA francs) in columns (1)–(4); dummy for no health
expenditures for any child in the household in column (5).
Column (1): specification in level; column (2): excludes the top 1%; column (3): log transformation – adding 0.001 to deal with zeros; column (4): inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation.
Standard errors, in (), are clustered at the PSF cluster level.
*p ≤ 0.1, **p  ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01.
francs between areas with the highest and the lowest ini-
tial prevalence (resp. above and below the average initial
prevalence). To put these numbers in perspective, Lépine
and Le Nestour (2012) report that, in rural Senegal in 2009,
health facilities charged an average of 200 and 100 CFA
francs for adult and child outpatient care, respectively.
So households increased their expenses on child health
by an amount which is not negligible. But this amount is
lower than the price of a bednet before malaria control
efforts started – around 6500–8000 CFA francs (President’s
Malaria Initiative, 2008). This is consistent with our claim
that, in the first wave, households could not afford preven-
tative malaria measures.
Results at the extensive margin are reported in Table 3,
column 5. The coefficient on the interaction term remains
of similar magnitude and significance as without fixed
effects. The fraction of households that started investing
in child health after anti-malaria campaigns was higher by
21 p.p. (resp. 9 p.p.) in areas with the highest initial preva-
lence, compared to the lowest prevalence (resp. in areas
above the average initial prevalence compared to areas
below). The extensive margin specification gives more pre-
cise results than the average spending per capita. The
reason is that health expenditures typically display long
right tails. There are several options to deal with this type
of distributions: excluding outliers (column 2), using a
log transformation (column 3) or an inverse hyperbolic
sine transformation (column 4). In all specifications, the
difference-in-differences coefficient is statistically signifi-
cant at conventional levels.
We  further inspect the distribution of non-zero health
expenditures to understand responses at the intensive
margin. Fig. 4a plots the kernel density estimates before
and after the campaigns, in high and low prevalence
areas. As expected, distributions are heavily skewed, fea-
turing low modes and long right tails. In low prevalence
areas, the distribution does not change between the two
waves. In high prevalence areas, people switch from
very low amounts to slightly higher amounts, converg-
ing toward the distribution in low prevalence areas. To
formally test whether the change in the distribution of non-zero health expenditures was different between high and
low prevalence areas, we  estimate a quantile regression.
Table A.4 in the Appendix reports the quantile difference-
in-differences estimates. Coefficients on Post are never
significant, confirming the absence of changes in low
prevalence areas. Coefficients on the interaction term are
all positive, confirming that the distribution shifted to the
right in high prevalence areas. Importantly, the quantile
difference-in-differences estimate at the median (Q50) is
1500 CFA francs, significant at 1%, representing an increase
by 75% relative to the baseline. As expected, coefficients are
precisely estimated for lower quantiles, whereas standard
errors are large for upper quantiles. Thus, there is a positive
response at the intensive margin as well. But it is difficult
to detect due to the large variance in health expenditures,
especially at the top.
Last, we discuss changes in the composition of health
expenditures illustrated by Fig. 4b. In low prevalence areas,
medication accounts for 60% of expenses, consultation for
31%, commuting to health facilities for 6% and hospitaliza-
tion for 3%. The breakdown does not change at all between
the two waves. The picture is different in high prevalence
areas. Before anti-malaria campaigns, households spent
a much larger share on medication (75%) and hospital-
ization (10%) and only 9% on consultation. The scope for
preventative care seemed very limited. The breakdown
changes markedly after the introduction of anti-malaria
subsidies and converges toward the composition observed
in low prevalence areas: less on medication and hospital-
ization, more on consultation. Parents allocated additional
expenses differently, with a smaller share spent on curing
episodes of malaria and a larger share spent on medical
examination. Another way  to distinguish between preven-
tative and curative treatments is to look at sick and non-sick
children separately (cf. Fig. A.1 in the appendix). The bulk
of health expenditures is made on sick children. Still, we
observe an interesting pattern on non-sick children: spend-
ing in high prevalence areas increased from virtually zero
in the first wave to around 2000 CFA francs in the second
wave, while remaining stable in low prevalence areas. The
difference-in-differences is significant at 10%. All in all, we
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Fig. 4. Non-zero child health expenditures, before and after anti-malaria interventions, by initial prevalence of malaria.
Notes:  Data: PSF Panel. Figure (a) plots the kernel density estimates of non-zero expenditures on child health before (graph on the left) and after (graph
on  the right) anti-malaria campaigns, in low (gray line) and high (black line) malaria prevalence areas. Figure (b) shows the composition of child health
expenditures before (graphs on the left) and after (graphs on the right) anti-malaria interventions, in low (graphs at the top) and high (graphs at the bottom)
malaria prevalence areas. Example: in low prevalence areas in 2006, 31% of expenditures were spent on consultation; 6% on commuting to health facilities;
60%  on medication; and 3% on hospitalization.
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Table  4
Difference-in-differences: health-seeking behavior.
Sample All children All children Sick children
Dependent variable Child is sick and untreated Child is sick Child is untreated
Diarrhea Fever and cough Diarrhea Fever Cough Fever and cough Diarrhea Fever and cough
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Using a linear probability model
Post × Prevalence −0.050 −0.115* −0.000 −0.137** −0.021 −0.092 −0.216* −0.129
(0.054) (0.059) (0.061) (0.064) (0.067) (0.076) (0.113) (0.111)
Post  −0.038*** −0.029* −0.022 −0.047** −0.053** −0.059** −0.128*** 0.002
(0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.036) (0.032)
Prevalence 0.067 0.052 0.019 −0.014 −0.195*** −0.130** 0.240*** 0.357***
(0.045) (0.051) (0.048) (0.050) (0.054) (0.061) (0.081) (0.081)
Constant 0.148*** 0.206*** 0.205*** 0.293*** 0.299*** 0.399*** 0.726*** 0.512***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.026) (0.023)
Mother FE No No No No No No No No
N  21,251 21,251 21,218 21,225 21,226 21,234 4221 6702
Mean  of dep. var in 2005 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.29 0.25 0.36 0.79 0.60
Panel  B: Using a logit model
Post × Prevalence −0.319 −0.774** 0.009 −0.879** −0.419 −0.566 −1.379** −0.572
(0.429) (0.373) (0.381) (0.349) (0.409) (0.351) (0.602) (0.474)
Post  −0.349*** −0.185* −0.140 −0.226** −0.242* −0.238** −0.547*** 0.016
(0.122) (0.111) (0.109) (0.111) (0.124) (0.109) (0.180) (0.132)
Prevalence 0.483 0.303 0.117 −0.068 −1.062*** −0.563** 1.479*** 1.515***
(0.315) (0.296) (0.286) (0.245) (0.304) (0.265) (0.506) (0.354)
Constant −1.746*** −1.347*** −1.354*** −0.881*** −0.839*** −0.406*** 0.946*** 0.036
(0.083) (0.083) (0.075) (0.073) (0.087) (0.077) (0.148) (0.096)
Mother FE No No No No No No No No
N  21,251 21,251 21,218 21,225 21,226 21,234 4221 6702
Mean  of dep. var in 2005 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.29 0.25 0.36 0.79 0.60
Data: DHS 2005 and DHS 2010. Samples: All children under age 5 in columns (1)–(6). Sick children under age 5 in columns (7)–(8).
Difference-in-differences regression without mother fixed effects. Panel A: Linear probability model. Panel B: Logit model.
Dependent variables in:
Columns (1)–(2) and (7)–(8): Dummy  equal to 1 if the mother did not seek any medical advice or medical treatment in case of diarrhea (columns (1) and
(7)),  and fever and/or cough (columns (2) and (8)).
Columns (3)–(6): Dummy equal to 1 if the child suffered from diarrhea (column (3)), fever (column (4)), cough (column (5)), and fever and/or cough (column
since the pool of children suffering from fever changed
in malarious areas after the campaigns. Due to data lim-
itations, we cannot run the regression for only coughs.(6))  in the last two weeks.
Standard errors, in (), are clustered at the DHS cluster level.
*p  ≤ 0.1, **p  ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01.
find evidence of a catch-up in health expenditures not only
in levels but also in composition.
6.2. Health-seeking behavior against other diseases
Table 4 Panel A presents the estimates of Eq. (1)
for health-seeking behaviors related to diarrhea and a
fever/cough.15 In columns 1 and 2, we look at the probabil-
ity of being sick and left untreated among all children under
age five. Between the two waves, this probability decreased
everywhere, and the decline was stronger in areas with
higher prevalence. Is the progress driven by fewer disease
episodes or by more remedial care? In a nutshell, we  find
evidence of changes in health-seeking behavior on the pre-
ventive side for fever, and on the curative side for diarrhea.
In columns 3 to 6, we look at the probability of being sick.
The likelihood of a fever, a major symptom of malaria,
decreased more in more malarious areas, supporting the
idea that the distribution of ITNs was effective in prevent-
15 These are the only diseases on which we  have information. In the data,
we  can distinguish between fever and coughs for the probability of being
sick, but not for the probability of being treated.ing malarious episodes.16 Trends for diarrhea and cough
are not statistically different between areas. In columns 7
and 8, we  restrict the sample to sick children and look at
the probability of being left untreated. In the case of diar-
rhea, parents were significantly less likely to seek medical
advice or treatment in higher prevalence areas in 2005. The
correlation entirely disappears between the two waves,
suggesting that parents started acting upon diarrhea once
they had been relieved from malaria. In the case of fever and
coughs, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative,
but smaller and not significant. This may  be explained by a
strong attenuation bias generated by selection into illness,16 In levels, parents are not more likely to report that a child was sick in
malarious areas, which is at odds with the medical literature describing
malaria’s toll on child health. One explanation is that measures of self-
reported health are influenced by socio-economic status. For instance,
Sen (2002) shows that Kerala, the state with the highest life expectancy in
India, consistently displays the highest rates of reported morbidity. This
may  explain why  reported morbidity is not lower in lower prevalence
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n Panel B, we  switch to logit specifications to account
or the binary nature of the outcomes. The difference-in-
ifferences coefficients are more precisely estimated than
ith linear specifications.
We can assess the external validity of our cross-disease
esult on diarrhea using DHS in other African countries. We
eed a similar empirical design: anti-malaria campaigns
tart between the two waves (time variation) and malaria
revalence is low enough in some regions (spatial vari-
tion). Two countries comply with these criteria: Kenya
nd Rwanda. As shown by Table A.5 in the appendix, the
ame pattern holds in both countries: high prevalence areas
atch up with low prevalence areas in the second wave. The
ntensity of the catch-up depends on the initial gap – higher
n Rwanda, lower in Kenya.
.3. Triple differences exploiting adults and campaign
ntensity
According to the model, the perceived change in malaria
ortality risk is the key driver of the response. Holding
nitial prevalence constant, health expenses are therefore
redicted to increase more in subpopulations with a higher
nitial risk or with a stronger change in risk. Children are
ore likely to die from malaria than adults.17 We  can
herefore use the evolution of adult health expenditures to
ccount for confounding changes in the demand and supply
f health. So far, we only exploited information on chil-
ren, but we observe annual health expenditures for each
ember of the household. We  are thus able to construct
he average health spending per adult in each household.18
o identify a causal impact, we need to assume that other
rivers of health expenditures specific to children evolved
n the same way in high and low initial prevalence regions.
esults are reported in Table A.6 in the appendix. Between
he two waves, adult health expenditures tend to increase,
nd the change is not correlated with malaria prevalence.
he coefficient on Post × Prevalence is small and never
tatistically significant. By contrast, child health expendi-
ures do increase proportionally with malaria prevalence.
oefficients on the triple interaction have the same sign
nd magnitude as the difference-in-differences estimates
eported in Table 3. This suggests that the demand and sup-
17 In 2000, 91% of malaria-related deaths affected children aged under
ve: 694,000 deaths in children out of 764,000 deaths in all ages in Africa
World Health Organization, 2015).
18 Specifically, we  estimate the following equation:
i,m,t =
ˇ0 + ˇ1 Postt + ˇ2 Postt × Prevalencem + ˇ3 Childreni
+ˇ4 Prevalencem × Childreni + ˇ5 Postt × Childreni
+ˇ6 Postt × Prevalencem × Childreni + um + εi,m,t
(2)
here Yi,m,t is the annual health spending per adult if Children = 0 and per
hild if Children = 1 in the household of mother m in wave t. We  include a
other fixed effect um to compare the evolution of adults and children in
he same household. ˇ2 captures any change in health expenditures cor-
elated with initial malaria prevalence. These changes may  be caused by
easons unrelated to malaria control – these regions are different to start
ith. Or they may  happen because of malaria control, but not through the
ompeting risks channel since malaria mortality is low among adults. The
ompeting risk channel, peculiar to children, is captured by ˇ6. ˇ6 iden-
ifies an additional change in health expenditures on children, compared
o  adults, which is correlated with initial prevalence. Economics 73 (2020) 102330 13
ply of health services in general (not specific to children)
did not increase more in areas with higher initial malaria
prevalence, and hence do not explain the catch-up in child
health expenditures.
Another interesting source of variation is the intensity
of the June 2009 national campaign. Some of the 76 health
districts distributed more ITNs than others. A monitoring
report identifies where the distribution was more mas-
sive (PNLP, INFORM and LSHTM, 2015). We  interact the
variables in Eq. (1) with Intensity a dummy  equal to 1 if
the household is located in a health district with more
intense campaigns. Estimates are shown in Table A.7 in the
appendix. The catch-up happens everywhere and seems
to be faster in districts where more bednets were dis-
tributed. Coefficients on Post × Prevalence are the same as
the difference-in-differences estimates, and coefficients on
the triple interaction are large, but not significant. By a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, we therefore argue that people
indeed responded more strongly when they experienced a
stronger change in malaria mortality risk.
7. Alternative hypotheses
Overall, we  find that, after anti-malaria campaigns, pri-
vate health investments, in total and against other diseases,
increased more in highly malarious areas than in low
prevalence areas. This is consistent with our framework
of investments under competing risks. In this section, we
discuss five alternative hypothesis that may  generate the
same empirical patterns: pre-trends, total income, access
to healthcare (infrastructure and campaigns), rainfall, and
geographical dynamics. We  explain why these explana-
tions do not confound our results, and in fact make them
stronger.
7.1. Pre-trends
The first concern we  need to rule out is that malari-
ous areas may  have started to catch up with non-malarious
areas long before the campaigns. Using DHS conducted in
1992 and 1997, we can look at the evolution of health-
seeking behavior against other diseases. Fig. 5 plots the
proportion of sick and untreated children in the case
of diarrhea. There are some fluctuations, 1997 being an
especially good year.19 But these fluctuations are similar
everywhere; in particular, the catch-up observed between
2005 and 2010 was not underway in the early 2000s.
7.2. Total incomeThe second alternative hypothesis argues that total
income grew faster in highly malarious areas. It might
be due to confounding factors, or specifically because of
malaria control if health improvements benefited adults,
19 We investigated whether this could be driven by seasonality in diar-
rhoeal diseases but it does not seem to be the case. All waves were
conducted in the winter and a methodological report assessing the qual-
ity  of DHS health data finds no evidence of seasonality of diarrhea in the





















Tests for alternative explanations.
























(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Post × Prevalence −84.226 0.064 −0.309** 11.253 3.094* −0.325* 8.881 3.940*** −0.442**
(68.264) (0.144) (0.133) (7.316) (1.582) (0.194) (7.096) (1.447) (0.177)
Post  23.223 −0.041 −0.125*** 0.734 0.098 −0.014 0.588 0.112 −0.017





Controls No No Zinc distribution Number of health workers Rainfall shocks
Mother  FE Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N  4550 19,098 4221 4550 4550 4550 4548 4548 4548
Mean  of dep. var. in 2006 310.1 0.40 0.79 5.24 −3.67 0.61 5.24 −3.67 0.61
Data: columns (1) and (4)–(9): PSF Panel. The level of observation is a household, composed of a mother and her dependent children. Columns (2)–(3): DHS 2005 and DHS 2010. Samples: mothers of children
under  18 in column (2) and sick children under age 5 in column (3).
Difference-in-differences regression. Linear Probability Model.
Dependent variables: column (1): Total expenditures for the household in the last 12 months in thousands of CFA francs; column (2): Dummy equal to 1 if distance to the nearest facility is a major problem when
the  respondent is sick and wants to get medical advice or treatment; column (3): Dummy  equal to 1 if the mother did not seek any medical advice or medical treatment in case of diarrhea; columns (4) and (7):
Health  expenditures per capita for children in mother’s household (thousands of CFA francs), in level; columns (5) and (8): log transformation – adding 0.001 to deal with zeros; columns (6) and (9): Dummy for
no  health expenditures for any child in the mother’s household.
Controls: Column (3): Quantity of zinc tablets delivered in the region. Columns (4)–(6): number of community health workers in the region. Columns (7)–(9): annual rainfall deviation from the cluster-level
mean.
*p  ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01.
Standard errors, in (), are clustered at the DHS or PSF cluster level.






























prevalence region of Thies. Using data published in a tech-
nical report from UNICEF (Derosena, 2011), we  are able to
control for the quantity of tablets distributed in each regionig. 5. Pre-trends in health-seeking behavior.
otes:  Data: DHS 1992, DHS 1997, DHS 2005, and DHS 2010. Sample: A
hildren in the case of diarrhea. Bars represent the 90% confidence interv
n particular mothers and breadwinners. This could lead
o a positive income effect in highly malarious areas, for
xample, through an enhancement of labor productivity.
f health investments are normal goods, an increase in
ncome should translate into an increase in health expen-
itures. To tackle this issue, we test whether there is
 differential rise in all expenditures. We  measure total
onsumption at the household level, including adults.
escriptive statistics in Table 2 indicate that households
n highly malarious areas were poorer than the others to
tart with: 185 vs. 384 thousands of CFA francs. Column
 in Table 5 shows that they did not catch up between
he two waves. The coefficient on the interaction term is
mall, insignificant, and if anything negative. Compared
o low prevalence areas, households in high prevalence
reas did not become richer; they merely reallocated part of
heir expenses to child health. We  tried to identify which
xpense items experienced a decrease, but the amounts
n question are too small to be detected.20 We  specifi-
ally looked at adult health expenditures to see if expenses
re reallocated from parents to children. This is not the
ase: adult health expenditures have increased every-
here between the two waves. This is consistent with
he competing risk channel and not with the adult health
hannel.20 Child health expenditures account for 3% of the household total con-
umption.en under age 5. The figure shows the proportion of sick and untreated
7.3. Access to healthcare
The third alternative hypothesis is about access to
healthcare. We  focus on three key elements that changed
during our period of interest.21 First, we exploit informa-
tion about distance to health facilities recorded in the DHS.
Mothers are asked whether distance is a main concern
when seeking medical advice or treatment for themselves.
As shown by Table 5, column 2, access was  a greater prob-
lem in areas with more malaria in 2005 and there was no
catch-up between the two waves. If anything, access seems
to have improved less in higher prevalence areas. Sec-
ond, there was a concomitant campaign against diarrhea.22
In 2010, approximately 6 million zinc dispersible tablets
were delivered to Senegal by UNICEF, and they were only
distributed in a few regions (Derosena, 2011). If these
regions were predominantly highly malarious areas, this
may  explain the change in health-seeking behavior against
diarrhea described in Table 4, column 7. In fact, the oppo-
site happened: the intervention was  piloted first in the low21 Ideally, we would need geo-coded data on health provision before and
after 2009 to comprehensively examine this mechanism. Service Provision
Assessment surveys provide this type of information but the first wave
was collected in 2012–2013, so we  cannot measure variations.
22 Another campaign against measles was implemented between 2005
and 2010. Using DHS data, we checked that the progress in immunization
coverage was  not correlated with initial malaria prevalence.
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when testing prediction 3 in Table 5, column 3. As expected,
the coefficient on the interaction term increases in size and
significance. Third, we examine the introduction of com-
munity health workers under the program PECADOM (Prise
En Charge A Domicile). Health workers conduct door-to-
door visits in their village to improve surveillance, testing,
and treatment. The system was introduced in three districts
in 2008 and gradually expanded to 37 districts by 2011,
covering both high and low prevalence areas (Plan National
de Lutte Contre le Paludisme au Sénégal, 2012). During that
period, health workers focused exclusively on malaria, so
these efforts to reach out to everyone cannot drive our
cross-disease result. Still, they lower transaction costs and
might explain why people start spending on malaria. Plan
National de Lutte Contre le Paludisme au Sénégal (2012)
provides detailed information on the change in the num-
ber of community health workers in each region between
the two waves of our panel. When we include this control
in Table 5, columns 4 to 6, our coefficients remain stable.
So the increase in spending in high prevalence areas is not
driven by a thicker network of health workers.
7.4. Rainfall
The fourth alternative hypothesis emphasizes the cor-
relation between rainfall and malaria transmission. The
occurrence and intensity of malaria infection is closely
related to rainfall patterns. The surge in health expendi-
tures in highly malarious regions could potentially result
from variations in the environment. If the year 2006 was
particularly dry while 2011 was particularly rainy, people
would have spent more on curative treatments in the sec-
ond wave. We  rule out this hypothesis using a geo-coded
measure of yearly rainfall provided by the Climate Hazards
Group23 that we were able to merge with the PSF panel,
with the exception of one cluster. This allows us to com-
pute positive (flood) and negative (drought) rainfall shocks
for each PSF cluster and for both waves.24 It turns out that
the year 2006 was slightly more rainy than usual (6 clusters
out of 149 experienced a flood) whereas the year 2011 was
slightly more dry (12 clusters experienced a drought). As
a consequence, our specification would tend to underesti-
mate the causal impact of anti-malaria subsidies on health
expenditures. When we control for the annual rainfall devi-
ation from the historical mean, our coefficients of interest
increase in magnitude and in significance (cf. columns 7 to
9 in Table 5).
7.5. Geographical dynamicsThe last alternative hypothesis is that our estimates
capture different dynamics between geographical areas,
23 We use the Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station
data (CHIRPS) that combines satellite imagery and rainfall station data to
produce annual precipitation measure from 1981 to 2015. For more infor-
mation on this dataset, see http://chg.ucsb.edu/data/chirps/index.html.
24 We define as positive (resp. negative) rainfall shocks the observations
whose annual rainfall measure is one standard deviation above (resp.
below) the cluster historical mean of annual rainfall calculated over the
1981–2015 period. Economics 73 (2020) 102330
for instance, between different administrative regions of
Senegal or between rural and urban areas. Malaria is more
prevalent in rural areas, as shown by Table 2. It may
be the case that rural areas caught up with urban areas
during the period of interest, for at least two  reasons.
First, there is more room for improvement. Second, food
and fuel prices increased substantially between 2006 and
2011, which might have constrained the growth of health
spending in urban areas. To rule out this concern, we first
look at urban and rural areas separately. Table A.8 in the
Appendix show that the same spending pattern is observed
in each subpopulation, although we  lose a lot of power
when splitting the sample. Estimates are larger in urban
areas, which is consistent with the theoretical prediction
that switchers are in the middle of the income distribu-
tion. In rural areas, the fraction of people for whom it
becomes profitable to invest in child health is likely to be
small; other constraints remain binding. More generally,
in Table A.9 in the Appendix, we  account for potentially
diverging regional trends by interacting Post with dummies
for each administrative region of Senegal (see borders in
Fig. 2). By comparing clusters with a different prevalence
located in the same region, we  find stronger results for
health expenditures (columns 1 to 3) and health-seeking
behaviors (columns 4 and 5). The difference-in-differences
coefficients are larger, suggesting that spurious geographi-
cal dynamics tend to attenuate the mechanism we  want to
highlight.
8. Robustness
Finally, this section presents robustness tests using
alternative definitions of the treatment, units of observa-
tions and standard errors. We  also account for migration
and attrition.
8.1. Alternative definition of treatment
The baseline econometric specification uses a contin-
uous measure of prevalence. Alternatively, we can use a
binary variable and check that our results hold up to dif-
ferent cuts. Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix report the
estimates of interest using as cutoff points the average
prevalence in 2000 and in 2006 as well as the thresholds
defining low endemicity (10%) and high endemicity (40%)
in the medical literature. Coefficients on the interaction
term are often more precisely estimated than with the con-
tinuous treatment. In particular, the effect at the extensive
margin is stronger and more significant when the cut-off
point is lower. This is informative about parental beliefs:
in the model, the fraction of switchers is related to the dif-
ference between the perceived child survival rate with and
without investing in anti-malaria products. This fraction
should be larger when the initial malaria mortality risk is
larger, but theory does not predict whether the relation-
ship should be linear, concave or convex. Our estimates
reveal that even small prevalence levels are perceived as
an important mortality risk by parents. Only people liv-
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ampaigns, while people facing a medium endemicity risk
espond almost as much as those facing a high risk.25
.2. Alternative unit of observations
In the results presented so far, the unit of observation
s the household. Per capita child health expenditures are
ikely to depend on the household structure, like the num-
er of surviving children and their age.26 One may  therefore
orry that our coefficient of interest captures a differen-
ial change in household structure. For instance, if mothers
n malarious regions are more likely to have another child
etween the two waves and health expenditures are higher
n infants than on older children, then we would observe
 relative increase in health expenses in these regions. To
ddress this concern, we change the unit of analysis from
he household to the child level.27 We  include all chil-
ren who were born and living with the mother in PSF1.
e follow them in PSF2, whatever the residence status,
nd examine the evolution of their health expenditures. In
able A.10, columns 1 to 3, in the appendix, we  confirm
hat testing predictions at the child level leads to the same
onclusion as the household-level test: individual expenses
ncrease much more in high prevalence areas. In columns 4
o 9, we split the sample of children depending on their age
t the time of the intervention. Coefficients are larger for
hildren younger than five in 2009. This is consistent with
ur model: episodes of malaria do greater harm to younger
hildren, in particular the under-fives, therefore parental
ealth-seeking behavior should change more in response
o the campaign.
.3. Alternative standard errors
We  consider two types of adjustments. First, we  use a
patial heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
HAC) estimator (Conley, 1999, 2008). The difference-in-
ifferences p-values for various distance cutoffs (from 10
o 250 km)  range from 0.14 to 0.18 when looking at expen-
itures in levels, and from 0.01 to 0.03 when looking at
he extensive margin. Second, we implement a procedure
o account for multiple hypothesis testing (Romano and
olf, 2005a,b). Those coefficients that are significantly dif-
erent from zero without the correction remain significant
t 10% with the correction. We  also perform a joint test of
he three predictions, taking together columns 1 and 5 of
able 3 and columns 1 and 2 of Table 4. The significance
evel of the joint test is 2%.
25 We come to the same conclusion if we estimate a regression with
revalence and Prevalence2 (not shown).
26 Mortality is potentially a concern but the number of households expe-
iencing a child death between the two waves is too small (below 2%) to
rive our results.
27 Another option is to introduce some controls related to the house-
old structure: average age of children, number of children, and share of
hildren under five. Our coefficients remain very stable in magnitude and
ignificance, as shown by columns 1 to 3 in Table A.11 in the Appendix. Economics 73 (2020) 102330 17
8.4. Geographical mobility
One potential concern is that we  define the area of res-
idence – high or low prevalence – using PSF1, and women
might have migrated between the two  waves. Migration
could explain our results if people migrate from high to
low prevalence areas and spend more on health in low
prevalence areas. This could be the case if people migrate
to cities, for instance. The scope for this concern is limited
because 93% of the balanced sample stayed in the same
city block or in the same village (cf. Table 2). If we  exclude
migrants, results are very stable, as shown in columns 4 to
6 in Table A.11 in the Appendix.
8.5. Selective attrition
Another issue would arise if the attrition observed in
the PSF panel were selected differentially between malar-
ious and non-malarious areas. Attrition is limited: only 5%
of mothers in malarious areas and 12% of mothers in non-
malarious areas were not found in the second wave. Our
coefficient of interest could potentially be biased upwards
in two cases. First, if attrited mothers in non-malarious
areas were precisely the ones with a large increase in health
expenditures between the two  waves. Second, if attrited
mothers in malarious areas were precisely the ones with
no change in health expenditures. The first condition is
unlikely to hold because attrited mothers in non-malarious
areas are richer and spend twice as much as non-attrited
ones on child health in PSF1. For them it is reasonable to
suppose that they were already investing in the preven-
tion of all diseases. Regarding the second condition, attrited
mothers in malarious areas were also richer but they spent
relatively little on health commodities for their children. If
anything, they seem to be in a situation where switching to
positive health spending is likely. All in all, our coefficient
of interest is more likely to be underestimated rather than
overestimated by attrition.
9. Discussion and conclusions
There are two potential channels through which anti-
malaria campaigns may affect behaviors: a strong decrease
in price and information.28 On the one hand, Armand et al.of the dangers of malaria among the population so that
people change their beliefs about the returns to avoid-
ing the disease. On the other hand, Dupas (2009) provides
experimental evidence that demand for malaria preven-
tion is very sensitive to price, but is not at all influenced
28 A third potential channel could be that distributing free products
impacted health care utilization via increased familiarity with health facil-
ities. However, in our context, the room for improvement seems limited
because the vast majority of mothers were already used to visiting local
health centers to get free care for themselves and their children. In 2005,
87% of pregnant women had received pre-natal care and over 95% of
children had received at least one vaccine (Ndiaye and Ayad, 2006).
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by the framing of marketing messages.29 Which role does
information play in our case? First, note that information
alone cannot explain the cross-disease effect. The campaign
focused exclusively on malaria: it was called Xeex Sibbiru
(“Let’s fight malaria” in Wolof) and stressed the importance
of sleeping under an ITN every night via various channels:
posters, certificates given to families who picked up an
ITN, singing competitions, etc. In the absence of changes
in prices, it is hard to explain why providing information
on malaria would raise private spending on other diseases.
Second, we exploit the fact that the information compo-
nent and the subsidy component of the campaigns did
not affect everyone in the same way to disentangle their
respective impact. Information was primarily targeted at
pregnant women or mothers of young children, while a
larger share of the population benefited from subsidies.
When we split the sample, the effect is not stronger for
women who received more information, but we  cannot
conclude with certainty due to large standard errors. Last,
we provide support for the price channel by showing that
households that started investing in health after the cam-
paign are in the middle of the income distribution. This is
consistent with our model: rich people had already started
to invest before the campaign, and very poor people still
could not afford any health expense.30
In a nutshell, this paper investigates how private health
investments responded to subsidies for anti-malaria prod-
ucts introduced in Senegal in the late 2000s. We  combine
panel data from a household expenditures survey and
repeated cross-sections on health-seeking behavior with
geographical information on malaria prevalence. We  find
that investments to fight malaria and other diseases
increased substantially in malarious areas, while they
remained stable in non-malarious ones. Pre-trends and
changes in total income and access to healthcare do not
explain this pattern. We  argue that these private responses
to a public intervention are consistent with a model of
health investments under competing mortality risks, in
which public and private spending are complements. Our
study concludes that recent anti-malaria interventions in
Africa have not crowded out private spending on child
health, quite the opposite. Malaria has long prevented par-
29 Similarly in the HIV literature, Godlonton et al. (2016) find that parents
are not more likely to circumcise their sons once they are informed that
circumcision prevents infection.
30 We can measure household total expenditures in the first wave, by
type of transitions. “Never Invest” are households that make no health
expenses in both waves, “Switchers” are households with no health
expenses in PSF1 and some expenses in PSF2, and finally “Always Invest”
are households with some expenses in both waves. “Switchers” are
poorer than “Always Invest” and wealthier than “Never Invest.” Another
way  to investigate heterogeneous responses by income level is esti-
mating an order 2 polynomial of income (measured pre-intervention).
We  interact Post and Post × Prevalence with Income and Income2 in the
specification with health expenditures per capita as the dependent vari-
able.  Coefficients on the triple interaction terms are of expected signs:
the response increases up to some point and then decreases. For clar-
ity of exposition, Fig. A.2 in the Appendix represents estimates of the
difference-in-differences as a function of total expenditures over the sup-
port observed in PSF1. We find the same inverted-U shape if we  use a
wealth index instead of income. Economics 73 (2020) 102330
ents from investing in child health and heavy subsidies
proved to be necessary to alleviate this constraint.
An interesting lead for further research would be to
examine whether changes in spending behavior go hand
in hand with changes in perceptions of health agency.
Once they can afford some investments in child health,
do parents feel more empowered? Are they less likely to
believe that child survival is first and foremost a matter of
luck? Whether parents consider infant mortality as exoge-
nous or endogenous has strong implications for population
dynamics, via the nexus mortality-fertility (Cigno, 1998).
When parents believe that there is nothing they can do
to improve the survival chances of their offspring, this
generates a motive for high fertility, namely diversifying
mortality risks. Realizing that those chances improve with
the amount of resources spent is a precondition for limiting
the number of births and investing more in each of them,




A.1 Medical literature on the impact of malaria control on
child health in Africa
Since the start of Roll Back Malaria in Africa, the evo-
lution of the disease in terms of prevalence and mortality
has been closely monitored by the WHO. According to their
estimates, the prevalence among children decreased from
33% in 2000 down to 16% in 2015, and the number of
deaths caused by malaria among children under five years
old decreased from 700K per year down to 300 K (World
Health Organization, 2015). A growing number of medical
studies, recently reviewed by Kesteman et al. (2017), aim
at estimating the contribution of malaria control efforts
to this progress. The vast majority of articles are either
local longitudinal studies, comparing outcomes before
and after the campaigns, or cross-sectional studies, com-
paring areas/individuals with and without anti-malaria
treatments. Most studies find a reduction in parasitemia,
number of acute cases, and child deaths. An influential arti-
cle published in Nature concludes that “current malaria
interventions have substantially reduced malaria disease
incidence across the continent” (Bhatt et al., 2015, abstract).
In Senegal, three articles provide evidence of a
causal relationship between malaria control interventions
and progress in child health using different, comple-
mentary methods. First, Lim et al. (2011) exploit the
2008–2009 Malaria Indicators Survey (MIS) to estimate
a cross-sectional matching model. They find that malaria
prevalence in children aged under five is significantly
lower by 33% in households that own an ITN. Second,
a longitudinal study in the surveillance site of Dielmo
systematically monitored epidemiological data over the
period 1990–2012 (Trape et al., 2014). In 1990, malaria
was  holoendemic in Dielmo: virtually all children were
infected, and they experienced five to six malaria attacks
























































• when  > h, parents do not invest in any disease: it is
never profitable to invest in l nor in h.P. Rossi and P. Villar / Journal o
ituation dramatically changed since the deployment of
ontrol interventions: the parasite rate fluctuates between
 and 3% in children, and the incidence of malaria attacks
as decreased 98-fold. The authors are able to rule out
onfounding factors and conclude that “malaria control
olicies combining ACT and deployment of ITNs can nearly
liminate parasite carriage and greatly reduce the bur-
en of malaria in populations exposed to intense perennial
alaria transmission” (Trape et al., 2014, p. 1). Third, in
 special issue, the American Journal of Tropical Medicine
nd Hygiene provides a plausibility framework for evalu-
ting the health impact of the scale-up of malaria control
nterventions on all-cause child mortality in Sub-Saharan
frica. Applying this framework to Senegal, Thwing et al.
2017) argue that “after considering coverage of malaria
nterventions, trends in malaria morbidity, effects of con-
extual factors, and trends in child mortality, it is plausible
hat malaria control interventions contributed to a reduc-
ion in malaria mortality and to the impressive gains in
hild survival in Senegal” (Thwing et al., 2017, p. 89).
pecifically, they document a decrease in mortality by 40%
etween 2005 and 2010, with greater declines among age
roups and regions initially most at risk for malaria. Using
ata from routine information systems, they also report
hat only 3% of consultations and 4% of deaths were due
o malaria after the interventions, against 34% and 18%,
espectively, in 2006.
.2 A simple model of private health investment decisions
nder competing mortality risks
.2.1 Set up
We model the decision of parents to invest or not in
hild health, x = {0; 1}, comparing costs and benefits in
 static framework. Consider a setting with two  causes
f child death: malaria (subscripted by m)  and another
omposite disease (subscripted by o). In a competing risk
ramework, the overall survival function until date t is
iven by the product of cause-specific survival functions:
(t) = Sm(t).So(t). We  denote sd the probability of surviv-
ng cause d until adulthood in the absence of any health
nvestment.
On the benefits side, we assume that parents can elim-
nate mortality risk from cause d if they choose to invest
n the prevention of this disease (xd = 1). We  denote v the
alue of a surviving child, which is assumed to be the same
or all households.
On the costs side, we assume that c(x) = (pm.xm +
o.xo)., where pd is the price of treatments against dis-
ase d, and  is a household-specific parameter reflecting
he heterogeneity in costs. The idea is to capture differences
n access to healthcare, credit constraints, and proximity to
ubsistence levels. The same price translates into a higher
tility cost if parents have to travel long distances, stand
n long lines, go into debt, take on risky jobs, sell valuable
ssets or forgo satisfying basic needs to get the treatment.
e think of  as an indicator of vulnerability: those house-
olds that have a high  are less able to afford medical
are. Economics 73 (2020) 102330 19
The utility depends on (xo, xm) as follows:
xo/xm 0 1
0 so.sm.v so.v − pm.
1  sm.v − po. v − (pm + po).
A.2.2 Solution
Let us start by considering cases where there is no trade-
off about xm, either because there is no malaria (pm = 0 so
x∗m = 1) or because there is no treatment against malaria
(pm = +∞ so x∗m = 0). Next, we turn to cases where malaria
exists and can be prevented.
A.2.2.1 When malaria does not exist. Parents invest in dis-
ease o iff the cost is lower than the benefit, i.e., po. ≤
(1 − so).v. The distribution of  in the population gives the
fraction of people spending money on child health: F(o),
where F(.) is the c.d.f. of , and o = (1−so).vpo is the threshold
below which it is profitable to invest in o in the absence
of a competing disease. More people invest in preventing a
disease if (i) the mortality risk from this disease is higher,
and (ii) the price of treatment is lower.
A.2.2.2 When malaria exists and cannot be prevented. Par-
ents invest in disease o if the utility of investing is greater
than the utility of not investing given the mortality risk
from malaria, which leads to the condition  ≤ sm.o. The
presence of malaria reduces the expected benefit from pre-
venting disease o, because it reduces the overall survival
probability. The fraction of people investing in child health,
F(sm.o), is lower than in non-malarious settings.
A.2.2.3 When malaria exists and can be prevented. We  derive
three segments of interest from the comparison of utilities
in the table above:
• when  > k, parents never invest in k.
• when  ≤ sj.k, parents always invest in k.
• when sj.k <  ≤ k, parents invest in k iff they invest in
j.
In the last segment, investing in one disease is prof-
itable iff the other cause of death has been eliminated. This
generates a complementarity between disease-specific
investments.
The optimal allocation depends on the relative position
of the different thresholds. Denote h (resp. l) the disease
with the highest (resp. lowest) threshold: l < h. It is
more profitable to invest in h because the mortality risk
is higher and/or the price is lower. For clarity of exposition,
we assume that l < sl.h.31 There are five segments:31 If we want to be more general, the two segments of interest are (i)
above max(sl.h; l), parents do not invest in any disease, and (ii) below
min(sl.h; l), parents invest in both diseases. In-between, many situations
can arise, including multiple equilibria, which uselessly complicates the
analysis.
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• when sl.h <  ≤ h, parents do not invest in any disease:
it is never profitable to invest in l, nor by complementar-
ity in h.
• when l <  ≤ sl.h, parents invest only in h: it is never
profitable to invest in l, and always profitable to invest in
h.
• when sh.l <  ≤ l , parents invest in both diseases: it is
always profitable to invest in h, and by complementarity
in l.
• when  ≤ l , parents invest in both diseases: it is always
profitable to invest in h and in l.
A.2.3 Comparative statics
What happens when the price of anti-malaria products
drops from very high levels to nearly zero? We  assume that
the new malaria threshold (′m) moves well above o while
the old threshold was well below (cf. Fig. A.3). In other
words, malaria used to be the binding constraint, depress-
ing investments in (at least some) other diseases, and it is
no longer the case once treatments become almost free.
The introduction of subsidies has two effects. First,
a direct effect on investments in malaria: when  ∈
[m; so.′m], parents switch from xm = 0 to xm = 1. Second,
an indirect effect on investments in other diseases: when
 ∈ [sm.o; o], parents switch from xo = 0 to xo = 1. The
fraction of parents who start investing depends on the
Fig. A.1. Health expenditures conditional on sickness.
Notes: Data: PSF Panel. The figure shows the evolution of annual health expenditu
and  high malaria prevalence areas, before (PSF1, bars 1 and 3) and after (PSF2, bars 
sample  (those with no sick child during the last 12 months, bars 1 and 2) and the
bars  3 and 4). In the non-sick sample, the p-value of the difference-in-differences
0.21. Economics 73 (2020) 102330
density of population in those segments. Note that the pro-
portion spending money on o is now the same as in the
non-malarious case.
A.2.4 Behavioral insights
Under the assumption that parents are rational and
have perfect information, the model predicts that a fraction
of people F(o) − F(sm.o) start investing in the preven-
tion of other diseases when eliminating malaria mortality
becomes affordable. One quantity is key in determining the
proportion of switchers: the change in malaria mortality
risk that can be achieved by investing. This is typically hard
to observe for parents. Are there more or fewer switchers
if we  introduce beliefs?
Let ı̂m be the difference between the perceived sur-
vival rate with and without investment. The length of our
new segment of interest is ı̂m.o compared to (1 − sm).o
in the perfect information setting. There are more switch-
ers when people overestimate the initial malaria mortality
risk and believe they can fully eliminate it. But if people
underestimate the effectiveness of anti-malaria products,
there can be fewer switchers.The campaign in itself might have an impact on beliefs.
It could raise ı̂m by making the risk of dying from malaria
more salient and/or increasing confidence in treatments.
This would increase the number of switchers.
res per child, in thousands of CFA francs (1 euro = 656 CFA francs), in low
2 and 4) anti-malaria interventions. Households are split into the non-sick
 sick sample (those with at least one sick child during the last 12 months,
 is 0.10. In the sick sample, the p-value of the difference-in-differences is
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Fig. A.2. Heterogeneity by income.
Notes: The figure shows the estimated difference-in-differences by income level. Specifically, the graph plots the following equation: y = −22.4 + 0.1426x −
0.000091x2 where x ranges from the minimum to the maximum values of total annual consumption levels observed in PSF1 excluding outliers. The coeffi-
cients  are obtained by interacting Post and Post × Prevalence with Income and Income2 in Eq. (1). The coefficient on Post × Prevalence is −22.4, p-value = 0.074.
The  coefficient on Post × Prevalence × Income is .1426, p-value = 0.049. The coefficient on Post × Prevalence × Income2 is −.000091, p-value = 0.123.Fig. A.3. Health investments (x∗m, x
∗
0) before and after subsidizing anti-malaria products.
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Table  A.1
Alternative definitions of prevalence: child health expenditures.
Level Log Zero spending
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: average prevalence in 2000
Post × High Prevalence 2.603 1.036** −0.115**
(1.910) (0.447) (0.055)
Post  0.842 0.327 −0.041
(1.465) (0.277) (0.033)
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes
N  4550 4550 4550
Mean  of dep. var. in low prev. areas in 2006 7.33 −3.06 0.56
Mean  of dep. var. in high prev. areas in 2006 1.72 −4.69 0.71
Panel  B: high endemicity threshold in 2000
Post × High Prevalence 3.180 0.773 −0.071
(3.322) (0.641) (0.084)
Post  1.441 0.629*** −0.076***
(1.071) (0.238) (0.028)
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes
N  4550 4550 4550
Mean  of dep. var. in low prev. areas in 2006 5.81 −3.57 0.61
Mean  of dep. var. in high prev. areas in 2006 1.10 −4.37 0.66
Panel  C: low endemicity threshold in 2000
Post × High Prevalence 0.374 1.481*** −0.179***
(2.019) (0.426) (0.050)
Post  1.607 −0.223 0.030
(1.503) (0.320) (0.036)
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes
N  4550 4550 4550
Mean  of dep. var. in low prev. areas in 2006 9.09 −2.40 0.49
Mean  of dep. var. in high prev. areas in 2006 2.77 −4.47 0.69
Panel  D: average prevalence in 2006
Post × High Prevalence 2.637 1.712*** −0.204***
(1.945) (0.421) (0.051)
Post  0.657 −0.046 0.007
(1.636) (0.270) (0.032)
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes
N  4550 4550 4550
Mean  of dep. var. in low prev. areas in 2006 8.03 −2.73 0.52
Mean  of dep. var. in high prev. areas in 2006 1.53 −4.90 0.74
Data: PSF Panel.
Difference-in-differences regression with mother fixed effects. Linear probability model. The level of observation is a household, composed of a mother
and  her dependent children.
Dependent variable in columns (1) & (2): Health expenditures per capita for children in mother’s household (thousands of CFA francs), in level in column
(1)  and log transformation adding 0.001 to deal with zeros in column (2). Dependent variable in column (3): Dummy for no health expenditures for any
child  in the mother’s household.
Panels A, B and C: we use the malaria prevalence in 2000 to construct the high/low prevalence areas indicators using as cutoff points the mean 24% (Panel
A),  the high endemicity threshold 40% (Panel B), or the low endemicity threshold 10% (Panel C). Panel D: we use the malaria prevalence in 2006 to construct
).the  high/low prevalence areas indicators (above/below the mean in 2006
Standard errors, in (), are clustered at the PSF cluster level.





















Alternative definitions of prevalence: health-seeking behavior.
Sample Average prevalence in 2000 High endemicity threshold in 2000 Low endemicity threshold in 2000 Average prevalence in 2006
Dependent variable All children Sick children All children Sick children All children Sick children All children Sick children
Child is sick Child is untreated Child is sick Child is untreated Child is sick Child is untreated Child is sick Child is untreated
Fever  Diarrhea Fever Diarrhea Fever Diarrhea Fever Diarrhea
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post × High Prevalence −0.041** −0.066* −0.026 −0.079* −0.086*** −0.073* −0.032 −0.077**
(0.020) (0.036) (0.023) (0.041) (0.029) (0.042) (0.020) (0.035)
Post  −0.062*** −0.147*** −0.083*** −0.168*** −0.012 −0.126*** −0.074*** −0.154***
(0.016) (0.029) (0.011) (0.020) (0.027) (0.037) (0.013) (0.024)
High  Prevalence −0.012 0.076*** 0.010 0.067** −0.021 0.086*** 0.008 0.082***
(0.015) (0.025) (0.019) (0.029) (0.020) (0.032) (0.016) (0.024)
Constant 0.296*** 0.746*** 0.287*** 0.778*** 0.306*** 0.721*** 0.286*** 0.757***
(0.011) (0.021) (0.008) (0.014) (0.018) (0.029) (0.009) (0.016)
Mother FE No No No No No No No No
N  21,225 4221 21,225 4221 21,225 4221 21,225 4221
Mean  of dep. var. in low prev. areas in 2006 0.30 0.75 0.29 0.78 0.31 0.72 0.29 0.76
Mean  of dep. var. in high prev. areas in 2006 0.28 0.82 0.30 0.84 0.29 0.81 0.29 0.84
Data: DHS 2005 and DHS 2010. Samples: all children under age 5 in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7). Sick children under age 5 in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8).
Difference-in-differences regression without mother fixed effects. Linear probability model.
Dependent variables: we check the robustness of the most important results in Table 4: the child suffered from fever in the last two weeks in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) and the mother did not seek any medical
advice  or medical treatment conditionally on the child suffering from diarrhea in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8).
In  columns (1) to (6): we use the malaria prevalence in 2000 to construct the high/low prevalence areas indicators using as cutoff points the mean 24% (columns (1) and (2)), the high endemicity threshold 40%
(columns  (3) and (4)), or the low endemicity threshold 10% (columns (5) and (6)). In columns (7) and (8): we use the malaria prevalence in 2006 to construct the high/low prevalence areas indicators (above/below
the  mean in 2006).
Standard errors, in (), are clustered at the DHS cluster level.
*p  ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01.
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Table  A.3
Regressions corresponding to figure 3.
Level Zero spending
(1) (2)








Mother FE No No
N  4550 4550
Mean of dep. var. in low prev. areas in 2006 7.33 0.56
Mean of dep. var. in high prev. areas in 2006 1.72 0.71
Data: PSF Panel.
Difference-in-differences regression without fixed effects. Linear probability model. The level of observation is a household, composed of a mother and her
dependent children.
Dependent variables: (1) Health expenditures per capita for children in mother’s household (thousands of CFA francs). (2): Dummy for no health expendi-
tures  for any child in the mother’s household.
Standard errors, in (), are clustered at the PSF cluster level.
*p ≤ 0.1, **p  ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01.
Table A.4
Quantile Difference in Differences in (non-null) health expenditures.
Health expenditures quantiles
Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Post × High Malaria 0.750*** 0.333 0.917** 1.067* 1.500*** 1.367* 1.500 4.417** 8.400*
(0.239) (0.262) (0.411) (0.446) (0.547) (0.768) (1.078) (1.787) (4.884)
Post  −0.250 −0.333 −0.333 −0.333 −0.500 −0.200 0.000 −1.000 −1.000
(0.204) (0.210) (0.312) (0.376) (0.414) (0.647) (0.928) (1.425) (4.126)
High  Malaria −0.750*** −1.000*** −1.833*** −2.400*** −3.500*** −4.000*** −6.000*** −10.667*** −19.400***
(0.216) (0.167) (0.264) (0.302) (0.408) (0.515) (0.697) (1.205) (3.749)
Mother FE No No No No No No No No No
N  1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981
Mean  of dep. var. in low prev. areas in 2006 1.25 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.50 7.00 10.00 16.0 28.0
Mean  of dep. var. in high prev. areas in 2006 0.50 1.00 1.17 1.60 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.33 8.60
Data: PSF Panel.
Quantile Differences-in-differences regression. Each column reports the coefficient estimated at the specified quantile. The level of observation is a house-
hold,  composed by a mother and her dependent children.
Sample: cells with stricly positive expenditures on child health.
Dep var: health expenditures per capita for children in the household (thousands of CFA francs).
Bootstrapped standard errors, in () based on 2000 replications.
*p  ≤ 0.1, **p  ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01.
Table A.5
External validity: estimating the cross-disease response in other African countries.
Senegal Kenya Rwanda
(1)  (2) (3)
Post × High Prevalence −0.066* −0.025 −0.167***
(0.036) (0.043) (0.049)
Post −0.147*** −0.296*** −0.184***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.023)
High Prevalence 0.076*** 0.021 0.107***
(0.025) (0.038) (0.027)
0.668*** 0.788***Constant 0.746*** 
(0.021) (0.028) (0.015)
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Table  A.5 (Continued)
Senegal Kenya Rwanda
(1) (2) (3)
Mother FE No No No
N  4221 3530 2017
Mean  of dep. var. in low prevalence areas in 2006 0.75 0.67 0.79
Mean  of dep. var. in high prevalence areas in 2006 0.82 0.69 0.89
Data: Senegal: DHS 2005 and DHS 2010. Kenya: DHS 2003 and DHS 2014. Rwanda: DHS 2005 and DHS 2010.
Sample: sick children under age 5.
In these three countries anti-malaria campaigns start between the two  waves (time variation) and malaria prevalence is low enough in some regions
(spatial variation). We use the malaria prevalence in 2000 in Senegal to define the high (above the average) and low (below the average) prevalence areas.
Difference-in-differences regression without mother fixed effects. Linear probability model.
Dependent variable: Dummy  equal to 1 if the mother did not seek any medical advice or medical treatment conditionally on the child suffering from
diarrhea.
Standard errors, in (), are clustered at the DHS cluster level.
*p  ≤ 0.1, **p  ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01.
Table A.6
Triple difference: Intra-household comparisons between adults and children.
Specification Prediction 1 Prediction 2
Level Log Zero spending
(1)  (2) (3)
Post × Prevalence × Children 7.457 2.324* −0.232
(9.220) (1.310) (0.144)
Post  × Prevalence −0.000 0.764 −0.114
(9.700) (1.420) (0.144)
Post  × Children −2.228 −0.788** 0.078**
(2.805) (0.335) (0.035)
Post  3.181 0.895** −0.092**
(2.657) (0.378) (0.039)
Prevalence × Children 16.191*** −0.669 0.142
(6.117) (1.011) (0.120)
Children −13.390*** −2.828*** 0.268***
(2.008) (0.251) (0.027)
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes
N  9104 9104 9104
Mean  of dep. var. for adults in 2006 15.4 −0.71 0.32
Data: PSF Panel.
Difference-in-differences regression. In both waves, each household provides two observations: the average health spending per adult and the average
health spending per child.
Dependent variables: Columns (1)–(2) Health expenditures per adult (Children = 0) or per child (Children = 1), in thousands of CFA francs. Column (1):
specification in level; column (2): log transformation – adding 0.001 to deal with zeros; column (3): Dummy  for no health expenditures for any adult
(Children = 0) or for any child (Children = 1).
Standard errors, in (), are clustered at the PSF cluster level.
*p  ≤ 0.1, **p  ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01.
Table A.7
Triple difference: variation in intensity of the 2009 campaign.
Specification Prediction 1 Prediction 2
Level Log Zero spending
(1) (2) (3)
Post × Prevalence × Intensity 44.313 3.335 −0.182
(37.649) (4.956) (0.601)
Post  × Prevalence 1.830 2.952** −0.346*
(4.486) (1.447) (0.184)
Post  × Intensity −8.096 −1.031 0.072
(8.391) (1.523) (0.190)
0.141 −0.018Post  0.840 
(1.817) (0.351) (0.041)
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Table A.7 (Continued)
Specification Prediction 1 Prediction 2
Level Log Zero spending
(1) (2) (3)
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes
N  4550 4550 4550
Mean  of dep. var. in 2006 for low intensity districts 5.21 −3.53 0.60
Data: PSF Panel.
Difference-in-differences regression with mother fixed effects. Linear probability model. The level of observation is a household, composed by a mother
and  her dependent children.
Dependent variables: Columns (1)–(2): Health expenditures per capita for children in the household (thousands of CFA francs). Column (1): specification
in  level; column (2): log transformation - adding 0.001 to deal with zeros. Column (3): Dummy  for no health expenditures for any child in the household.
“Intensity” is a dummy equal to one if the number of ITNs distributed in the household’s health district during the 2009 campaign is above the median.
Standard errors, in (), are clustered at the PSF cluster level.
*p ≤ 0.1, **p  ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01.
Table A.8
Rural and urban samples.
Rural Urban
Level Log Zero spending Level Log Zero spending
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × Prevalence 3.665 1.512 −0.144 2.091 5.253* −0.632*
(6.118) (1.949) (0.246) (8.414) (2.669) (0.330)
Post  1.839 0.643 −0.084 0.395 −0.254 0.031
(1.783) (0.633) (0.077) (2.334) (0.421) (0.048)
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N  2339 2339 2339 2211 2211 2211
Mean  of dep. var. in 2006 2.02 −4.55 0.70 7.37 −2.76 0.52
Number of clusters 64 64 64 86 86 86
Data: PSF Panel. Rural clusters in columns (1)–(3), urban clusters in columns (4)–(6).
Difference-in-differences regression with mother fixed effects. Linear probability model. The level of observation is a household, composed of a mother
and  her dependent children.
Dependent variables: health expenditures per capita for children in the household (thousands of CFA francs) in columns (1)–(2) and (4)–(5); dummy  for
no  health expenditures for any child in the household in columns (3) and (6).
Columns (1) and (4): specification in level; columns (2) and (5): log transformation – adding 0.001 to deal with zeros.
Standard errors, in (), are clustered at the PSF cluster level.
*p ≤ 0.1, **p  ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01.
Table A.9
Controlling for regional trends.
Predictions 1 and 2 Prediction 3
Level Log Zero spending Diarrhea Fever and cough
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post × Prevalence 11.188 4.324** −0.488* −0.076 −0.188**
(6.973) (2.139) (0.267) (0.074) (0.088)
Post  2.003 −0.336 0.045 −0.039 −0.058**





Mother FE Yes Yes Yes No No
N  4550 4550 4550 21,251 21,251
Mean  of dep. var. in 2006 5.24 −3.67 0.61 0.17 0.22
Data: Columns (1)–(3): PSF Panel. Columns (4)–(5): DHS 2005 and DHS 2010, sample of all children under age 5.
Difference-in-differences regression with mother fixed effects in columns (1)–(3) and without fixed effect in columns (4)–(5). Linear probability model
controlling for regional trends.
Dependent variables: (1)–(2) Health expenditures per capita for children in moth
(1)  and log transformation - adding 0.001 to deal with zeros in column (2). (3): Du
(4)–(5):  Dummy  equal to 1 if the mother did not seek any medical advice or me
(column 5).
Standard errors, in (), are clustered at the PSF or DHS cluster level.
*p ≤ 0.1, **p  ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01.er’s household (thousands of CFA francs), specification in level in column
mmy  for no health expenditures for any child in the mother’s household.
dical treatment in case of diarrhea (column 4), and fever and/or cough
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Table  A.10
Difference-in-differences at the child level.
Full sample Children younger than 5 in 2009 Children older than 5 in 2009
Level Log Zero spending Level Log Extensive margin Level Log Zero spending
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Post × Prevalence 6.120 3.663*** −0.428*** 14.320 4.561*** −0.492*** 2.090 3.222*** −0.396***
(5.807) (1.120) (0.135) (8.880) (1.287) (0.155) (6.197) (1.170) (0.140)
Post  0.074 −0.664** 0.081*** −2.638 −1.053*** 0.111*** 1.399 −0.474* 0.067**
(1.729) (0.262) (0.030) (2.669) (0.333) (0.038) (2.095) (0.271) (0.031)
Child  FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N  8146 8146 8146 2656 2656 2656 5490 5490 5490
Mean  of dep. var. in 2006 4.24 −4.69 0.75 4.71 −4.31 0.70 4.02 −4.87 0.76
Data: PSF Panel. Sample of children living with their mother in the first wave.
Difference-in-differences regression with child fixed effects. Linear probability model.
Dependent variables: Columns (1)–(2), (4)–(5), (7)–(8): Individual health expenditures (thousands of CFA francs), specification in level in columns (1), (4)
and  (7), and log transformation – adding 0.001 to deal with zeros in columns (2), (5) and (8). Columns (3), (6) and (9): Dummy for no individual health
expenditures recorded.
Standard errors, in (), are clustered at the PSF cluster level.
*p  ≤ 0.1, **p  ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01.
Table A.11
Robustness tests.
Controlling for sibship structure Excluding migrants
Level Log Zero spending Level Log Zero spending
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × Prevalence 5.651 2.758** −0.300* 7.280 3.032** −0.344*
(5.585) (1.384) (0.173) (6.396) (1.405) (0.176)
Post  1.647 0.255 −0.035 0.571 0.148 −0.019
(1.849) (0.373) (0.043) (1.863) (0.347) (0.041)
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N  4550 4550 4550 2974 2974 2974
Mean  of dep. var. in 2006 5.24 −3.67 0.61 4.18 −3.73 0.61
Data: PSF Panel. Sample in (4)–(6): Mothers residing in the same geographical cluster in both waves. The level of observation is a household, composed of
a  mother and her dependent children.
Difference-in-differences regression with mother fixed-effects. Linear probability model.
Dependent variable in (1)–(2) and (4)–(5): Health expenditures per capita for children in mother’s household (thousands of CFA francs); specification in
level  in columns (1) and (4), and log transformation – adding 0.001 to deal with zeros in columns (2) and (5). Dependent variable in (3) and (6): Dummy
for  no health expenditures for any child in the mother’s household.














ontrols included in (1)–(3): average age of children, number of children
tandard errors, in (), are clustered at the PSF cluster level.
p  ≤ 0.1, **p  ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01.
ppendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
ound, in the online version, at https://doi.org/10.1016/
.jhealeco.2020.102330.
eferences
dhvaryu, A., Nyshadham, A., 2014. Endowments at birth and parents’
investments in children. Econ. J. 126 (593), 781–820.
lmond, D., Mazumder, B., 2013. Fetal origins and parental responses.
Annu. Rev. Econ. 5, 37–56.
rmand, A., Carneiro, P., Locatelli, A., Mihreteab, S., Keating, J., 2017. Do
public health interventions crowd out private health investments?
Malaria control policies in eritrea. Labour Econ. 45, 107–115.
aranov, V., Kohler, H.-P., 2018. The impact of aids treatment on savings
and human capital investment in malawi. Am.  Econ. J.: Appl. Econ.
10  (1), 266–306.
ennett, D., 2012. Does clean water make you dirty? Water supply and
sanitation in the Philippines. J. Hum. Resour. 47 (1), 146–173.
hatt, S., Weiss, D.J., Cameron, E., Bisanzio, D., Mappin, B., Dalrymple, U.,
Battle, K.E., Moyes, C.L., et al., 2015. The effect of malaria control on
plasmodium falciparum in africa between 2000 and 2015. Nature
526  (7572), 207–211.
leakley, H., 2010. Malaria eradication in the americas: a retrospective
analysis of childhood exposure. Am.  Econ. J.: Appl. Econ. 2 (2), 1–45.re of children under 5.
Chang, F.-R., 2005. A theory of health investment under competing
mortality risks. J. Health Econ. 24, 449–463.
Cigno, A., 1998. Fertility decisions when infant survival is endogenous. J.
Popul. Econ. 11, 21–28.
Conley, T., 1999. Gmm  estimation with cross sectional dependence. J.
Econom. 92 (1), 1–45.
Conley, T., 2008. Spatial Econometrics, 2nd Ed. New Palgrave Dictionary
of  Economics.
Cutler, D., Fung, W.,  Kremer, M.,  Singhal, M., Vogl, T., 2010. Early-life
malaria exposure and adult outcomes: evidence from malaria
eradication in India. Am.  Econ. J.: Appl. Econ. 2 (2), 72–94.
Deressa, W.,  Ali, A., 2009. Malaria-related perceptions and practices of
women with children under the age of five years in rural ethiopia.
BMC  Public Health 9 (1), 259.
Derosena, M.,  2011. Challenges in Changing Diarrhea Treatment Policy in
Senegal, Technical Report.
DeVreyer, P., Lambert, S., Safir, A., Sylla, M.B., 2008. Pauvreté et structure
familiale, pourquoi une nouvelle enquête? Stateco 102, 261–275.
Dow, W.H., Philipson, T.J., Sala-i Martin, X., 1999. Longevity
complementarities under competing risks. Am. Econ. Rev.,
1358–1371.
Dupas, P., 2009. What matters (and what does not) in households’
decision to invest in malaria prevention? Am.  Econ. Rev. 99 (2),
224–230.
Dupas, P., 2011. Health behavior in developing countries. Annu. Rev.
Econ. 3, 425–449.
Dupas, P., 2014. Short-run subsidies and long-run adoption of new
health products: evidence from a field experiment. Econometrica 82
(1),  197–228.
f Health
Ivanovich, E., Newby, H., Carvajal-Velez, L., Lynch, M.,  Komatsu, R.,
Cibulskis, R., Moore, Z., Bhattarai, A., 2017. Framework for evaluating
the health impact of the scale-up of malaria control interventions on28 P. Rossi and P. Villar / Journal o
Fortson, J., 2011. Mortality risk and human capital investment: the
impact of HIV/aids in sub-Saharan Africa. Rev. Econ. Stat. 93 (1),
1–15.
Godlonton, S., Munthali, A., Thornton, R., 2016. Responding to risk:
circumcision, information and HIV prevention. Rev. Econ. Stat. 98
(2), 333–349.
Jayachandran, S., Lleras-Muney, A., 2009. Life expectancy and human
capital investments: evidence from maternal mortality declines. Q. J.
Econ. 124, 349–397.
Kesteman, T., Randrianarivelojosia, M.,  Rogier, C., 2017. The protective
effectiveness of control interventions for malaria prevention: a
systematic review of the literature. F1000Research 6, 1932.
Kim, K., Lee, M.,  2019. Difference in differences in reverse. Empir. Econ.
57,  705–725.
Lépine, A., Le Nestour, A., 2012. The determinants of health care
utilisation in rural senegal. J. Afr. Econ. 22 (1), 163–186.
Lim, S., Fullman, N., Stokes, A., Ravishankar, N., Masiye, F., Murray, C.J.,
Gakidou, C.M., 2011. Net benefits: a multicountry analysis of
observational data examining associations between
insecticide-treated mosquito nets and health outcomes. PLoS Med. 8
(9).
Lucas, A.M., 2010. Malaria eradication and educational attainment:
evidence from Paraguay and Sri Lanka. Am.  Econ. J.: Appl. Econ. 2 (2),
46–71.
Lucas, A.M., Chidothe, M.,  Wilson, N.L., 2019. Effects of adult health
interventions at scale on children’s schooling: evidence from
antiretroviral therapy in Zambia. Econ. Educ. Rev. 72, 107–120.
Mugisha, F., Kouyate, B., Gbangou, A., Sauerborn, R., 2002. Examining
out-of-pocket expenditure on health care in Nouna, Burkina Faso:
implications for health policy. Trop. Med. Int. Health 7 (2), 187–196.
Ndiaye, S., Ayad, M., 2006. Enquête démographique et de Santé au
Sénégal 2005, Technical Report.
Ndiaye, S., Diouf, P.D., Ayad, M.,  1994. Enquête démographique et de
santé au sénégal 1992/93, Technical Report.
Onwujekwe, O., Chima, R., Okonkwo, P., 2000. Economic burden of
malaria illness on households versus that of all other illness
episodes: a study in five malaria holo-endemic Nigerian
communities. Health Policy 54 (2), 143–159.
Oster, E., 2012. Hiv and sexual behavior change: why not Africa? J.
Health Econ. 31, 35–49.Plan National de Lutte Contre le Paludisme au Sénégal, 2012. Rapport
d’activités 2012, Technical Report.
Plan National de Lutte Contre le Paludisme au Sénégal, 2015. Plan
Stratégique National de lutte Contre le Paludisme au sénégal
2016–2020, Technical Report. Economics 73 (2020) 102330
PNLP, INFORM and LSHTM, 2015. Senegal: A Profile of Malaria Control
and Epidemiology, Technical Report.
President’s Malaria Initiative, 2008. Fy 2007 Senegal Malaria Operational
Plan, Technical Report.
Pullum, T.W., 2008. An Assessment of the Quality of Data on Health and
Nutrition in the DHS Surveys 1993–2003, Technical Report.
Ravindran, S., 2018. Parental Investments and Early Childhood
Development: Short and Long Run Evidence from India, Working
Paper.
Romano, J., Wolf, M.,  2005a. Exact and approximate stepdown methods
for  multiple hypothesis testing. J. Am.  Stat. Assoc. 100 (469), 94–108.
Romano, J., Wolf, M.,  2005b. Stepwise multiple testing as formalized data
snooping. Econometrica 73 (4), 1237–1282.
Sachs, J., Malaney, P., 2002. The economic and social burden of malaria.
Nature 415 (6872), 680.
Sen, A., 2002. Health: perception versus observation. Br. Med. J. 324,
660–661.
Tarimo, D.S., Lwihula, G.K., Minjas, J.N., Bygbjerg, I.C., 2000. Mothers’
perceptions and knowledge on childhood malaria in the holendemic
Kibaha district, Tanzania: implications for malaria control and the
imci strategy. Trop. Med. Int. Health 5 (3), 179–184.
Thwing, J., Eckert, E., Dione, D.A., Tine, R., Faye, A., Yé, Y., Ndiop, M., Cisse,
M.,  Ndione, J.A., Diouf, M.B., Ba, M.,  2017. Declines in malaria burden
and all-cause child mortality following increases in control
interventions in Senegal, 2005–2010. Am.  J. Trop. Med. Hyg. 97 (3),
89–98.
Trape, J.-F., Tall, A., Sokhna, C., Ly, A.B., Diagne, N., Ndiath, O., Mazenot, C.,
Richard, V., Badiane, A., Dieye-Ba, F., Faye, J., Ndiaye, G., Diene Sarr,
F.,  Roucher, C., Bouganali, C., Bassène, H., Touré-Baldé, A., Roussilhon,
C., Perraut, R., Spiegel, A., Sarthou, J.-L., da Silva, L.P.,
Mercereau-Puijalon, O., Druilhe, P., Rogier, C., 2014. The rise and fall
of  malaria in a west African rural community, Dielmo, Senegal, from
1990 to 2012: a 22 year longitudinal study. Lancet Infect. Dis. 14 (6),
476–488.
World Health Organization, 2015. World Malaria Report 2015. WHO,
Geneva, Technical Report.
Yazoume, Y., Eisele, T., Eckert, E., Korenromp, E., Shah, J., Hershey, C.,all-cause child mortality in sub-Saharan Africa. Am.  J. Trop. Med.
Hyg. 97 (Suppl. 3), 9–19.
